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I.

THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION.

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THE recent celebration of the 400th anniversary of the birthday of Martin Luther the German Reformer, and of Ulric Zwingli the Swiss Reformer, by the Protestant churches of Europe and America, may be regarded as a new challenge to the Christian world to consider the grounds on which the Protestant Reformation rests. A movement in history cannot be fully understood in its own age. It is only after it has been tried and its fruits have become apparent that it can be studied and judged in a way that is free from all undue prejudice. We cannot judge the reformation by the opinions entertained in regard to it by the reformers themselves, who were instruments in bringing it to pass. It is a question whether even the Apostles saw the full force and meaning of their work in founding the Christian Church. St. Paul could hardly have looked down through coming ages and estimated the significance of his epistles, as they are now read and applied to the Church under its widely varying conditions. Much less then could we expect uninspired reformers to comprehend

fully the nature and meaning of the work in which they engaged. Especially is this the case in regard to their views of the Roman Church which they antagonized, and the relation of Protestantism to that church. Even yet this problem of the relation of Protestantism to Romanism cannot be fully understood, nor the full meaning of the mission which Protestantism is to accomplish in the history of the one, holy, catholic Church; just because we are still in the modern era, and that era is not closed. Whether Romanism is to disappear entirely in the course of future ages, and Protestantism remain as the only stream of the Church life, or a new era is to come in which will harmonize the antagonism in a higher form of Christianity, we cannot certainly know until another epoch is reached.

But a period of 400 years is certainly sufficient to test such a movement as Protestantism and to judge it on its merits. Nothing is lost, therefore, but much gained by reviewing this movement, as has been done to a large extent by the Anniversaries referred to. Those anniversaries would be of little account, indeed, if they were limited to a study of the lives of those great and good men merely. So far as they may have involved a glorification of those men only, they carried with them real imperfection and injury. The reformation was greater than the individual men who were the agents in bringing it to pass, and the anniversary of their birth is significant and important mainly as it leads us to be devoutly thankful for the reformation itself, and confirms our faith in its principles. It is a new challenge to Romanism to reconsider its estimate of Protestantism. After its four hundred years of history it will not do any longer to characterize it as a petty quarrel produced by a few ambitious monks, or a rank rebellion against the Church of Christ. Whatever its merits or demerits may be it has become a factor in history whose influence cannot be ignored. It guides and directs the civilization of the leading nations of the world at the present time, those nations that have grown out of the Teutonic race as distinguished from those composed mainly of the old Romanic race.

All that we can undertake on so broad a subject is merely to present a few reflections upon the principles of Protestantism, and then notice some of the charges urged against them.

In distinguishing the Reformation from a mere *restoration* we claim that it brought forth something new in the history of the Church, that it was a real advance on the whole previous history of the Church, in the line of legitimate historical development. The Reformation cannot be sustained on the theory of mere repristination. We cannot find a *fac-simile* of Protestantism in Primitive Christianity.

The first five centuries are generally, and of right, claimed as an inheritance for all churches. It was a formative period, during which the ancient creeds were produced, the ancient liturgies were framed, and the fundamental dogmas formulated. Being so near the Apostolic period, and as yet united, the Church of that age presents great elements that all Christian denominations claim to have inherited. The Roman Church has been accustomed to claim the interpretation of the Scriptures by the *Fathers* as of authority for all times. But since Abelard wrote his *Sic et non Sic*, it has been admitted that their interpretation does not furnish a *consensus*; they differ much among themselves. That age itself was formative and progressive. We may find there no less than three different theories of the Episcopacy, that of Ignatius, of Irenæus, and of Cyprian. Even in the ante-Nicene period we find three different views on the doctrine of the Eucharist, an Oriental, a North-African, and an Alexandrian. There was by no means an entire uniformity in the rites and ceremonies of cultus, and in theological views there were the same differences and shades of difference that we find in any other age. There was, indeed, a general harmony on all essential doctrines, but along with this also the rise and development of serious heresies and schisms.

The general tendency throughout that period included what became subsequently characteristic of the Roman church. In Ignatius already we find a theory of the Episcopacy of which

there is no trace in the New Testament. That theory underwent a development in Cyprian, and further onward it found higher centres in the Metropolitan and the Patriarch, and gradually culminated in the Papacy. In regard to the worship of saints and angels, and of the Virgin Mary, the doctrine of transubstantiation, the *opus operatum* theory in general of the sacraments, the external unity of the Church as essential to, and logically preceding, its internal unity, in short most of what are known as Romish peculiarities are found within the first five centuries, at least in their germs, looking towards their more full development during the Middle Ages.

And, on the other hand, we look in vain for any clear apprehension and statement of the peculiar prominent principles of Protestantism among the Church fathers generally. Not that they were not held at all and entered implicitly into the faith of that age, but they came to no clear enunciation. Nor does this at all disturb us. We keep in mind that the Romish peculiarities and tendencies were weaker and rarer in the first two centuries, and that from this time, especially the first century, very little has come down to us, so that we are left for the most part without data as to precisely when and how these peculiarities came in. It can be easily seen, however, that they stand in contrast and contradiction with the New Testament and the Apostolic Church, that they cannot be supported by an appeal to this source, and that to sustain them Romanism always must have recourse to tradition as equal in authority with the Scriptures.

Our conclusion, therefore, is, that the Primitive Church cannot be taken as a standard for all subsequent ages, any more than any other age can be regarded as a model or measure for all time. Each age has its own problems to solve, its own peculiar characteristics, and during its history there are always growth and progress looking to a future age. There is no absolute *consensus patrum*. The unity of the Church at the very first, as to its outward form, centred mainly in Apostolic tradition, then in the œcumenical councils, and finally

and gradually in the papacy. No modern church can claim to be a repristination of the primitive church. The Roman hierarchy, in doctrine, polity, and cultus, developed during the Middle Ages far beyond the church of the first five centuries, and Protestantism in all its sections, presents features that cannot be harmonized with that first age. The effort to find a basis of union for all the churches, Roman and Protestant, in that age was tried by Calixtus in the seventeenth century, and seconded by Bossuet, but it failed. The attempt of a section of the Anglican church, initiated by Pusey and others, to repristinate the primitive church failed, but resulted in carrying some of the best thinkers and most earnest men, such as Newman, Wilberforce, and others, back into Romanism. The Tractarian movement has left as a succession the ritualistic element in the English Church, which upholds high-church views generally, and particularly the doctrine of Apostolic succession exclusively through Episcopal ordination, which theory came in with Archbishop Laud, but was not held in the earlier time of the Reformation.

It has been growing fashionable in the high-church wing of the Episcopal Church in more recent years to talk of the Reformation as a Revolution in Germany, and to claim that the Anglican church is not a Protestant church, but simply a restoration of that church as it existed in its earlier and purer period. In our judgment this theory will not stand, and its advocacy will simply tend to make Episcopalianism a half-way house to Rome for its members. There can be no middle ground between Romanism and Protestantism in the case of those churches that were involved in the movement in the sixteenth century. They must be out and out one or the other, for a number of reasons, among which we may give this one, that no theory of mere repristination can stand, because the law of *historical development* rules in the history and development of the Church, as well as in history generally. The Reformation was more than a mere restoration.

This repristination theory is held by some in other Pro-

testant churches, who seek to trace the true Apostolic succession through certain comparatively unimportant sects, such as the Paulicians, the Catharists, Albigenses, Waldenses, etc. These sects have their significance, some being in the line of rank heresy, others comparatively negative and harmless, and still others important as belonging to the general preparation for the Reformation. The attempt to find such a succession only tends to weaken and belittle Protestantism. Those sects are much too loosely connected to constitute anything like a real outward succession, and entirely too weak in numbers to claim that they constituted the only and entire true church during those ages.

Equally untenable is the view that the Reformation was a *revolution*, if by this it is meant to weaken or destroy its organic connections with the ages previous to the sixteenth century. It is held by some who make little or no account either of the outward organization of the Church or its historical connection. They regard the Church as made up of individual believers and as invisible so far as outward organization and boundaries are concerned. They look upon the Reformation as a revival of true religion, growing directly out of the influence of the Holy Spirit and the study of the Scriptures. Such revival may come at any time without previous preparation, and it may uproot and overthrow the existing state of things with very little reference to the past. It is radical in that it heeds not to conserve any existing features of the Church, but may build, *de novo*, on the foundation of the Word of God, in the same way that the Church was founded in Apostolic times. It makes no account of tradition. The œcumenical creeds of the primitive church are not retained as having any special authority or importance. The period of the Middle Ages, so far as the Church organization of that time is concerned, is set aside as a blank, or as a real lapse into unbelief, and the Roman hierarchy is looked upon as a synagogue of Satan. This theory has different phases, from a mere unhistorical view of the Church to the extreme of Quakerism.

It has grown weaker, however, since new and better views of history itself have come to prevail. The deeper thinking of the age regards humanity as an organism, and history as the onward movement of its life. History is not a mere narrative of events, but it traces the unfolding of the life of the race in its organic connections from age to age, looking towards a consummation included in it potentially from the beginning. Christianity is historical. Since the time of Schleiermacher, who brought out the view that it is essentially life, and not merely a system of doctrine or a new law, and that this life has its source in the person of Christ, and since the time of Neander, the father of modern Church history, the view that Christianity itself is historical, has come more generally to prevail among Church historians.

When we say that Christianity is historical, we do not mean, of course, that it is a mere development of the religious nature of man along with other religions, nor do we mean to question or deny that in its objective essence it is unchangeable; but we mean that as a new, divine life, entering into humanity, it is apprehended in a historical way. There are degrees in its subjective apprehension. This is true, not only in regard to individual life, but to the Church as a whole. These degrees or stages are progressive. The truths contained in the Scriptures, though complete and full from the beginning, are appropriated in the degree in which the church moves onward to its final consummation. We can only state this point without dwelling upon it at length here.

Christianity is, and must be, historical also because it enters into organic relations with secular history which is progressive, as we have stated. As the divine in Christ could penetrate and permeate the human only in the degree His humanity was unfolded to apprehend it, and as the Christian religion can, in like manner, sanctify and mould the natural life only as this life develops, so Christianity can leaven humanity only in the degree history develops more fully the life and resources of the race, or the world. In an infantile age of history, religion can

be apprehended only in a rudimentary way, but when the life of the race is developed in civilization, in government, science, art, business and trade, etc., the same religion penetrates these and brings them under its moulding power. Our conclusion, therefore, is, that Christianity must be historical. If that be granted, then such an epoch as the Reformation requires to be viewed in that way. It was not a sudden revolution. It did not come without preparation. It was not radical in overthrowing all that went before and re-establishing the Church, *de novo*.

Yet in regarding it in this historical way, we must not be unmindful of the divine agency that wrought as a factor. The Holy Spirit continues to guide the Church into all truth, and we must be able to see in such epochs His special agency, in bringing to the consciousness of the Church new truth from God's Word. It was not by chance, nor merely through man's wisdom, that certain doctrines of holy Scripture came to be apprehended in a new light in the sixteenth century. The Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians and to the Romans were contained in the inspired record from the beginning, and yet they seemed to have a special message, and to flash forth new truth for that generation. Who shall say there are not other depths of the Scriptures that may have a special message to a future generation when the need of the Church shall call such message forth? The Reformation, we may suppose, was not the last epoch before the second Advent.

Let us now proceed to restate what new elements the Reformation brought forward in the history of the Church. Our space requires us to limit ourselves to these few points, and inasmuch as they have been treated so fully, and are so familiar to our readers, we can aim only at a restatement of them, together with a few remarks in their explanation and defence.

The doctrine of the supreme authority of the inspired Scriptures over against tradition, if we may call it a doctrine, it became a necessity to assert in order to reform the Church of its errors and abuses. The Roman Church tried to reach such

a reformation in itself, but it was helpless by reason of the attitude it sustained to the Word of God as the only supreme authority for faith and practice. When the reforming Councils were called they could accomplish nothing just because they had no supreme directory to guide them. They tried to assert their freedom from the Papacy, which had proved itself not only a fallible guide, but often an obstacle in the way of progress and reformation. They failed in their effort to make the papacy representative in its relation to the Church; hence the decrees of the Council could have no final authority without the endorsement of the pope. Moreover the Council itself was not infallible, because it was itself human, and besides was liable to be constituted in such a way as to represent only a small portion of the Church. The large majority of the Council of Trent, for instance, was composed of delegates from Italy alone.

Long before the Reformation the movement started to bring the teachings of the Scriptures to the people, and now when the contest concerning the truth commenced in earnest, Zwingli in Switzerland and Luther in Germany led the way in their appeal to the Word of God as of supreme authority over popes and Councils. On this principle the Reformation planted itself, and there Protestantism stands to-day, after 400 years existence and trial, and Romanism sets up tradition as of equal authority.

It seems plain that while unwritten tradition may be a valuable help, just as all history is valuable, when the inspired Word of God stands as the final appeal, yet in itself it can present no valid claim to stand on equality with Scripture. Who can guarantee that it has lost nothing or gained nothing, by being handed down through all the ages in such unwritten form? And when it stands in plain contradiction to the Word of God, or has no recognition in the Word of God, as for instance the worship of the Virgin Mary and prayers to the saints, must it not be said of it, as our Lord said of the Jewish Church, *Ye teach the traditions of men and overlook and neglect the pure Word of God.*

The chief argument urged against this principle is that inspired and infallible Scriptures require an infallible interpreter, otherwise they are of no service. It is urged moreover that Protestantism substitutes private judgment, the natural understanding of each individual, as the interpreter of Scripture.

Is it true that the inspired Scriptures require for their interpretation an external infallible teacher, such as the pope claims to be? Before our Saviour left the world He did indeed promise a teacher who would lead the disciples into all truth. When He, the *Paraclete*, is come He will lead you into all truth. But this was an internal guide, and one that is present in all believers. Christ never intimated that some other outward infallible guide would be given to fill the office of teacher for the whole Church. The Word of God was to be the inspired oracle, and the Holy Spirit was to be the inward guide. Beyond this the gift of teaching was given to a *class* of men, not one *only*, to instruct the people. "And He gave some, Apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers," etc. Eph. 4: 11. When differences arose in the Apostolic Church, a Council was called at Jerusalem, composed of the Apostles and Elders, and in consultation a decision was reached under the guidance of the Holy Ghost. "For it seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us," etc., the decision begins. At that Council St. Paul and Barnabas and St. Peter gave counsel, and St. James gave the final decision. There is no evidence in the New Testament, nor in the practice of the Apostolic Church, that one infallible teacher was delegated, but all the Apostles acted in that capacity. And further, when the Apostles were passing away there is no evidence that any other infallible guide was given except their teaching, and we know that the primitive Church was accustomed to appeal to this. No one bishop stands out as including in himself this prerogative above all others. True, in the course of time the bishop of Rome came to have a certain pre-eminence, but there are instances to show that his decisions were not regarded as infallible.

But it is urged that in the nature of the case such an infallible teacher is necessary, otherwise the Scriptures can be of no practical use. If there is no guarantee that the Scriptures are infallibly interpreted by some one person, there is no assurance that the Church interprets them truly. Such a theory presumes that the Church at large, all believers, are not illumined by the Holy Spirit to understand the Word of God, that all are merely to receive its meaning externally from him. In that case it is difficult to see why the Scriptures were given to any one but the bishop of Rome. And to that it did come in the Roman Church, that the Bible was not intended for the people generally, but only for the clergy, the *ecclesia docens*, whilst the members, the laity, constituted the *ecclesia audiens*, the hearing church. And this was one thing protested against in the Reformation. It was claimed that all believers are priests, and all have the right to read the Bible, and to have part, too, in interpreting it.

The argument proves too much. If an infallible revelation must have an infallible teacher to mediate it to others, then there would be the same necessity that there should be an infallible teacher to mediate his teaching to others again in the Church. For it must be remembered that the immediate teaching of the pope must go through many lower grades of teachers all over the world before it reaches the people. If now his teaching can be apprehended by the whole Church without infallible teachers, it is difficult to see why the words of Scripture cannot be apprehended by the Church directly. Even he requires to take counsel from his bishops and theologians in order to arrive at a final conclusion. Protestants claim that such power to understand the Word of God is possessed by the Councils of the Church, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, without the necessity of any one being specially inspired or illumined for this purpose. In this way the apprehension of the truth is not mechanical, not external, but there are free organs, some having higher endowments than others, but all joined in sympathy.

And this sets aside the theory of private judgment in the perverted form it is usually urged by Romanists against Protestants. They say the Bible among Protestants is left to be interpreted by the natural reason of each one for himself. The Reformers never taught that, and Protestants do not hold it. They maintain that the guidance of the Spirit is necessary in order to understand the Bible, that the mind must be in sympathy with the supernatural truth of Scripture, and moreover that the truth is more and more evolved through consultation, and a recognition of organs endowed with special gifts. Just as in the Apostolic Church the Apostles and elders came together to consult over these things, under the guidance of the Spirit, and attending to the words of the more gifted among them, so Protestantism makes use of the same means to reach the interpretation of difficult portions of the Word of God. It may, indeed, be said that the interpretations thus produced do not always agree, but we claim that in the main and on essential doctrines they do agree. There is a Protestant *consensus* which has held Protestant churches together, and which is drawing them closer as the ages go by. Entire uniformity cannot be reached, just because truth is essentially life, and its apprehension must make room even for individual differences. But on all essentials of Evangelical truth there is a unity and a harmony fully as much as are to be found beneath the surface in the Roman Church; for every one knows it has its schools and phases of difference too. A uniformity that does not allow freedom, even to the extent of individual variations of thought in apprehending the truth, is a dead uniformity, and destroys the true nature of faith itself.

This claim that, in addition to the revelation God has made in His Holy Word, and the guidance of the Holy Spirit, there must be *one person* appointed as an infallible teacher, or interpreter, of that revelation, looks very much like an *ex post facto* theory to bolster up the papacy. It has no precedent in the Old Testament economy. There was no personage in that economy corresponding to the character claimed for the pope

in the New Testament economy, and yet they had the Scriptures to interpret. It is mechanical, because it takes out of the hands of the Church a work which belongs to it as a whole and places it arbitrarily in the hands of one man. And it has proved itself incorrect practically more than once in history. Not to name other examples that might be cited, two Councils pronounced pope Honorius II. a heretic for deciding *ex cathedra*, that Christ had but one will, the *Monothelite* heresy. If that decision was not *ex cathedra* those two Councils made a most egregious mistake, which, so far as we know, was never corrected by any other Council. But we cannot pursue this point any farther.

The second Protestant principle, designated the *Material* principle, has also stood the trial and criticism of 400 years without suffering any diminution of support from the Word of God or the experience of Christians. The doctrine of justification by faith and not by the works of the law is held by Protestants in all their denominations as it was in the time of the Reformation. St. Paul's language is so clear and plain that it cannot be misunderstood. No statement in regard to man's depravity could be stronger than that in Romans chap. iii. vs. 10-13, and none could be plainer as to the way of justification than in the same chap., vs. 20-31. "Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law." Luther is charged, indeed, with interpolating the word "alone" in this passage. We do not justify this insertion, but that it was made with no design to change the meaning of the text may be charitably supposed, when we consider that the same word is found in the "oldest German Catholic Bilbe of Nuremberg, 1483, and also in two Italian versions, 1476 and 1538." (*Dr. P. Schaff, in Lange's Com. on Romans.*)

It means that on condition of faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, the sinner is received into covenant relation to God, which is signed and sealed to him in baptism, and without any merit on his part God pardons his sin and regards him as freed from the condemnation of the law.

The Roman Church makes no distinction between justification and sanctification, and maintains that justification has degrees as sanctification has, that the sinner is pardoned, or justified only in the degree in which he has become subjectively righteous. But this is clearly a mingling together of things that are different. God regards an infant as sinful and guilty because it is potentially in that condition; why may He not regard the believer as also potentially righteous when he becomes a partaker of the redemption of Christ by faith? There is no contradiction in this, and no wrong done to man's condition ethically considered. The old objection that it requires God to declare a man just when he is not just, fails to distinguish between an objective relation and a subjective condition. A man may be transferred from citizenship in one country—as England—to that of another, as the United States, upon a declaration of his will, by the act of naturalization. His relation is changed, whereas his subjective condition has undergone no change. Yet the change in his status is a necessary condition to his living as an American citizen. Justification places the sinner objectively in such a status before God as that his new life can begin to unfold in actual experience in his new relation to God. In an ethical point of view he cannot begin to render a true obedience to the law until he has assurance of pardon through faith. This is the right order. A state of faith is the only vantage ground from which he can begin the new life of obedience to the divine law.

This doctrine may be misrepresented now as it was by the Antinomians in the time of the Reformation. There is no real antagonism between the law and the gospel, faith and works. Men cannot be saved *in* their sins, but they may be saved *from* their sins. The question here is, by what gateway the sinner is to make his entrance to the divine favor. He cannot come by the law, because it only condemns. He cannot commend himself by his own righteousness, because that is worthless. He is shut up, therefore, to the righteousness which is of God by faith, and that righteousness can be made over only on condition of faith in the Lord Jesus Christ.

It cannot be denied that the Roman Church had lapsed into a semi-Pelagian spirit during the Middle Ages. The old Augustinian doctrine of man's fallen condition, of his utter helplessness to recover himself, and of salvation as a free gift of grace, fell into the background, and in its stead had grown up a doctrine of the merit of good works which stood in contradiction to it. The whole system of pilgrimages and penances, culminating in the bold and bad traffic of indulgences, grew out of this Pelagianizing spirit. There was a necessity, therefore, for a bold proclamation of the Pauline doctrine of salvation by grace alone through faith, and not by the works of the law. We may allow that this was an advance, not only on the church of the Middle Ages, but also upon primitive Christianity. Augustine, with all his strong teaching on human depravity, still made room, in a measure, for the merit of good works, and he also made the bold assertion that he would not believe the Bible except on the authority of the Church; but this only shows that Protestantism was an advance on previous ages, and brought forward new truth out of the Word of God. The Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians and to the Romans lay dormant, as it were, until the occasion called them forth, and so they became the chief sources of appeal for the reformers. And this is only in accordance with the theory of historical development. The Church advances in its apprehension of the truth entrusted to its keeping. That truth is the same in all ages, it is complete and full in the Word of God, but its apprehension and self-appropriation are progressive. No one can question that the primitive Church during the first five centuries, in that sense, developed new truth in bringing out and formulating its great creeds, its theology, and its liturgies, partly in answer to rising heresy, but partly also from the necessity of advancing in the intellectual apprehension of the truth implicitly contained in their faith. Faith and knowledge are internally one, and therefore what is implicitly involved in the former seeks to find explicit utterance in the latter. In this way we support the legitimate right of the Church in the sixteenth century to bring

out what was new, while it also retained the full substance of the faith of all ages.

And this leads us now to notice the charge made by Romanists, that the Reformation broke with the Apostolic succession in the life of the Church. The Church is an organism, it is catholic, it must be in union at all stages with its source in the Apostolic age. Did not Protestantism break this connection in the sixteenth century, and is it not now a branch cut off from the parent stock? Let us see.

Of course we deny the theory that this connection holds in the outward tactual succession through episcopal ordination. If that theory is strictly held, we maintain there could be no sure guarantee that any of the existing churches have it. Who can be absolutely assured that the Roman Church has it, counting back through the revolutions that have prevailed at such times as the great schism when one pope reigned in Rome, another at Avignon? or in the period of the trigamy, when three popes held sway? Who can be assured that every baptism in the line of eighteen centuries was performed with the right *intention* of the priest, without which baptism is invalid? No, if that is absolutely essential to constitute valid Apostolic succession, then we would despair of finding it anywhere.

The true Apostolic succession holds in the life of the Church, and with that there was no real break in the Reformation. Four hundred years ought to be a test and a proof that Protestantism is in union with the original fountain of Christian life. St. Paul attested his claim to his high office by the works he wrought and the fruits that accompanied his labors, even though his call was extraordinary. Protestantism can point to the same proofs of its divine call. Life is deeper than outward form. There may be irregularities here and there in external forms, but the life flows on.

But was not Protestantism put under the ban of excommunication, and is it not under that ban to-day? And does not that carry with it the power to cut off a branch that refuses submission to the pope? We reply, only when the outward

ban rests on right and truth. Suppose, what is altogether possible, the Church authority excommunicates a member upon what proves to be entirely false testimony, while he is entirely innocent, does such excommunication actually exclude the member from the kingdom of God? Did not the Jewish church excommunicate the disciples of Christ, yea, even put the ban of *anathema* upon Christ Himself? And were they and He really excommunicate? No. What then becomes of the power of excommunication, and the promise, "Whatsoever ye shall lose on earth shall be loosed in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven"? Only this, we reply, that while the rule holds, the judgment of the Church is not in all cases infallible. Our Lord said to the servants who wanted to make here on earth a final separation between the wheat and the tares, "Let both grow together until the harvest." Human judgment has its place, but it is not identical with the absolute and final judgment of God, who alone knows infallibly all who are His. Who will pretend that every act of exclusion from the Church by every priest since the days of the Apostles has been infallible and valid? We would take the risk of a Huss who was burned at the stake for heresy, and that of thousands more who have been put to death both by Romanists and Protestants in the ages when bloody persecution prevailed. The actual church is not identical with the ideal church, and in this sense we must maintain the distinction Protestantism makes between the visible and invisible Church. And so we conclude that *some* fulminations of the Vatican have been harmless, a *telum imbellis sine ictu*.

It remains yet to notice the influence of Protestantism on morals. It is asked, What did the Reformation reform? It is true that there was an unfavorable reaction in public morals and in the efficiency of self-government immediately after the Reformation set in. This was to be expected. The removal of external restraints imposed by the Roman Church, in the religious and secular spheres, would naturally have this effect. The reformers deplored it in strong language that is often quoted

against them. Every step of progress from a lower to a higher and freer government involves such perils and temporary disadvantages. The people depended on external restraint. They were trained to it for ages. There was very little self-government in church or state. The civil government was held under the power of the hierarchy, and all kinds of offenses, whether civil or religious, were punishable by physical penalties. For a time Protestantism continued this practice.

But since Protestantism has more fully wrought out its system, since the civil government has confined itself to its own sphere, at least more than formerly, and the Church visits spiritual penalties only for offenses against it, we may now make the comparison without fear of the judgment that may be given. Of course a general judgment in such a question may amount to very little. There are so many things to be taken into the account that it is very difficult to make a just comparison. The Roman Catholic Church is most numerous in Romanic nations, Italy, Spain, France, Mexico, while the Protestant Church predominates in Germany, England, Scotland, the United States, etc., where the population is Teutonic. Certainly Protestantism need not shrink from the comparison. In the spread of general intelligence, in the development of self-government, in benevolent and charitable institutions, in the encouragement given to science and art, in short all that enters into advanced civilization and culture, Protestant nations not only keep apace with, but are in advance of, we think, Roman Catholic countries. The Reformation certainly gave a new impulse to freedom of thought, to the independent progress of science, and the spread of general intelligence. This independence is considered by Romanists as an evil. But certainly the world would not wish to go back to the principles that prevailed in this matter during the Middle Ages, when all sorts of learning were held under the control of the Church. Is it not better, it is asked, to have learning under the direction and guidance of Christianity? Yes, if the guidance be free; No, if it be external and coercive. Science and education

generally have their own rights, just as the state has, and it is not the mission of the Church to enforce control over either. There may be perils in such freedom, but they are necessary to the advancement of civilization. The Church is not qualified to give, much less to enforce, its decisions in regard to science. There is a certain freedom of thought that cannot be restrained by any human power. Christianity must be content with using its influence to leaven all science and learning; further it cannot go, and when it seeks to coerce submission it simply goes beyond its authority and becomes an impediment to the progress of civilization. In this respect Protestantism is clearly in advance of Romanism in the Middle Ages, and it is very evident that much of the liberal spirit that now prevails in Roman Catholic countries is due to the influence of Protestantism. Rome has had control of Italy, for the most part undisturbed, during all the centuries since the papacy became an established fact there. We presume no Romanist will pretend that it has produced a better, or more advanced, civilization there than exists in Germany, England, or the United States.

Did space allow we might refer to the original teaching of Protestantism, to the language of Protestant Confessions, and the logical inferences deducible therefrom, as well as to the opinions of unbiassed historians, to show that Protestantism occupied an advanced position in regard to civil liberty as compared with the Romanism of the Middle Ages. One need only refer to the theory advocated by Hildebrand and to the bulls of Boniface VIII. in order to see that in that age the Church claimed the right and power to control the state with absolute authority. The example of Hildebrand against the emperor of Germany, and still more of Innocent III. against King John of England, may be cited to the same purpose. Innocent not only excommunicated the king, which he had a right to do, treating him as a member of the Church, but he proceeded to put the kingdom under an interdict, which was a doubtful exercise of power to say the least, punishing the innocent for the guilty. And then to cap the climax of tyranny he even went so

far as to depose him from his office, which he had no authority to do, released his subjects from their allegiance and declared his country open to conquest by whomsoever might be able and ready to take possession. Even his own arch bishop at length took a position against him and sided with the barons, who wrenched from the king the *Magna Charta*. No explanation can excuse such exercise of tyrannical power by the Church over the state. There are many practical contradictions in the history of Protestantism on this subject, but its general tendency, logically carried out, has been towards a freer and truer relation between Church and state. In the United States, where it has been untrammelled by complications inherited from the past, it has wrought in favor of civil liberty.

CONCLUSION.

This 400th anniversary of the birth of two leaders of the Protestant Reformation suggests many reflections. We have space to present only one. The Thirty Years' War seemed to decide the question as to the continuance of both Protestantism and Romanism in modern history. Neither were allowed to crush out the other. We may infer from a history of four hundred years that both have a mission to perform. Protestantism we regard as the purer form of Christianity that was to supersede the old. It controls the leading nations of history. But we may allow that Romanism still had a work to do in the Romanic nations. It is a remarkable fact that Protestantism could gain no permanent foothold in those nations. Even in France, which is not so purely Romanic, and where Protestantism once struggled for the victory, the Roman Catholic religion recovered and maintained its supremacy. Perhaps those nations were not prepared for Protestantism, and perhaps they needed the Latin Church to hold them for the time. We may, in this view, regard the Roman Catholic Church as having a mission to fulfill, and so it has continued to stand. There can be no conquering of the one by the other through external force. Both must be left free to work

out its own mission. The issue must be left in the hands of Him who overrules all for His glory. Whether both shall live on as hitherto, side by side, to the end, or one live and the other pass away, or whether one shall reach an epoch in which both shall be taken up in a still more advanced form of the Church, these are questions that history alone can solve. It was Schelling, we believe, who first advanced the theory, that the Latin Church was Petrine, the Protestant Pauline, and the Church of the future is to be Johanean. The first represented the legalistic spirit, the second, the spirit of freedom, the third, of love. But who can forecast the course of history? As Protestants we may rest content with what four centuries have brought to pass, and enter upon another century with implicit faith in the promise of our Lord, that "the gates of hell shall not prevail against His Church." The religion of Jesus Christ is the absolute religion that shall stand while the world stands, as an ark of safety to all who flee to it for eternal life.

II.

ASSYRIAN RESEARCH AND THE OLD TESTAMENT.¹

BY PROF. F. A. GAST, D. D.

SUCH is the supreme importance of the Bible, that we should welcome with glad hearts whatever new light is cast upon its sacred pages. And how much new light, from many and often unexpected quarters, the present age enjoys! The progress of Biblical knowledge in the nineteenth century is simply marvelous. Our own generation has done more by its geographical explorations, its archæological discoveries and its historical researches, to illustrate the facts of Scripture, to confirm its statements, to clear up its obscurities, and to make the scenes it depicts real to our minds, than all the former generations combined. It is true, indeed, that the knowledge thus obtained sheds light only on the exterior side of the Bible, and that it cannot illuminate its inner recesses of spiritual and divine truth. But it must never be forgotten that the spiritual presence enshrines itself in an historical form, through which alone it can be reached. And whatever, therefore, aids us to a fuller and clearer understanding of the Scripture, even in its external character as a body of literature, and gives us a better knowledge of its original languages, its geography, its antiquities and its histories, must be of priceless value. Who must not rejoice, accordingly, at the progress of research amid the sacred scenes of Palestine, the wild valleys and rocky cliffs of Sinai, and the temples, obelisks and tombs of Egypt? Who must not

¹ An address delivered at the opening of the Theological and Literary Institutions at Lancaster, Sept. 3, 1883.

rejoice especially at the flood of light the monuments of Assyria and Babylonia are pouring on the pages of the Old Testament?

On the east bank of the Tigris, opposite Mosul, are found vast shapeless mounds of earth and rubbish, covering the remains of the once mighty city of Nineveh, which for more than 500 years was the terror of western Asia and the haughty mistress of the world. In magnitude and magnificence it had no rival. According to Diodorus Siculus, it formed a quadrangle with a circuit of not less than 60 miles, and was surrounded by walls 100 feet high, broad enough for three chariots to ride abreast, and defended by 1500 towers, each 200 feet in height. And though this is, doubtless, a gross exaggeration, yet from the Old Testament itself we learn that "Nineveh was an exceeding great city of three days' journey," (Jon. iii. 3), having "more than six-score thousand persons" who could not "discern between their right hand and their left hand" (Jon. iv. 11), and containing, therefore, a population of not less than 600,000 souls. For centuries it was the centre of the world's life. From it issued forth the armies that subdued and the edicts that swayed the nations far and near. It was the seat of an immense traffic, rivaling that of Tyre—a vast treasury, where countless riches, acquired by predatory wars and cruel exactions, were hoarded up—in a word, one of the wonders of old, by reason of its size, its splendor and its power.

But even this height of glory could not shield it from Jehovah's wrath. While Nineveh was yet in the midst of its magnificence and pride, Nahum uttered his prophecy of destruction; and his prophecy had not long to wait for its fulfillment. It was probably in the year 606 B. C. that the city was overthrown, its monuments destroyed and its inhabitants scattered. From that hour it disappeared from history. Unlike many other cities, it never rose from its ruins. It is not mentioned in the Persian inscriptions of the Achaemenian dynasty. Herodotus, who passed near the city, perhaps over its very site, scarcely two centuries after its destruction, makes no allusion to its ruins.

When Xenophon, in his retreat with the 10,000 Greeks, encamped at or near this celebrated spot, the very name of Nineveh had become unknown. During the Roman period, indeed, there seems to have been a small castle or fortified town on the site of the ancient city; but it had certainly been abandoned when Heraclius in 627 A. D. gained his great victory over the Persians on the very spot where Nineveh had stood. Benjamin of Tudela in 1070 A. D. found here many inhabited villages and small castles, but about a century later the place was entirely destroyed.¹ From that time its very site was forgotten, and Bochart tells us that the learned endeavor in vain to determine its location.

Nor was it determined with certainty until within the last half century. It was evident, indeed, to every intelligent observer, that the two great mounds directly opposite Mosul, named Kouyunjik and Nebi Yunus, represented some great city of antiquity; and Mr. Rich, many years political resident of the East India Company at Baghdad, convinced himself by personal examination, in the year 1820, that they covered the ruins of that ancient, celebrated city; but it needed the excavations, begun just forty years ago and continued to the present hour, to put all doubts at rest forever.

It is not my purpose at this time to rehearse the remarkable story of the disentanglement of Nineveh and its remains. It is sufficient to say that Layard, who spent the years 1845-1847 and 1849-1851 on the spot, discovered in the south-western part of Kouyunjik, the palace of Sennacherib with its 71 chambers and halls; that in the northern part of the same mound, Rassam discovered, in 1854, the palace of Assurbanipal, the Sardanapalus of the Greeks, with its highly finished bas-reliefs and its rich library of several thousand clay tablets; and that in 1872, George Smith discovered in the so-called Lion-hunt chamber the fragments of the clay tablets containing the Chaldean account of the creation and the deluge. Since the sudden death of Smith, in 1876, Rassam has been called a second

¹ Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, Art. *Nineveh*.

time by the British Museum to superintend the excavations, and his principal aim has been to recover the remains of the royal library. New and valuable tablets are continually coming to view, and yet, in spite of the fact that the British Museum often employs as many as a hundred men a day in digging, it is the judgment of Rassam that a century will be required to unearth all the monuments of Nineveh and transport them to London.¹

It is not, however, to the monuments as such that I wish now to direct your attention, but rather to the inscriptions they contain. These inscriptions are found everywhere and in large numbers—on slabs of stone, on detached obelisks, and on colossal human-headed lions and bulls—on vessels of bronze, such as vases and weapons, helmets and weights—on pottery in the various forms of tablets, bricks, cylinders, and six-sided and eight-sided prisms. They are in that peculiar style of writing called *cuneiform* or wedge-shaped, because the characters are composed of elements which, being thicker at one end than at the other, have the appearance of wedges. Wholly unlike our alphabetic writing, it consists of wedges vertical, horizontal and oblique, combined in every conceivable manner, to form the single written signs. Cuneiform writing was not confined to Assyria and Babylonia. It has been found throughout a large part of western Asia, as on the monuments of Persepolis and elsewhere in Persia, on the rocks of Behistun at the western boundary of Media, in the neighborhood of Lake Van in Armenia, on the ruins in Mesopotamia, and here and there in Syria and Asia Minor, and even in Egypt. Nor is it everywhere of the same type. Three principal species have been distinguished: the *Persian*, which is the simplest of all, and is alphabetic, consisting of about 40 characters; the *Median*, which is

¹ Not to distract the reader's attention by continual reference to foot-notes, I shall give under each topic the authorities consulted and freely used.

On *Nineveh and its disentanglement*, see Layard's *Nineveh and its Remains*, 1849; Layard's *Nineveh and Babylon*, 1853; Herzog's *Real Encyclopädie*, 2d ed., Art. *Ninive und Assyrien*, by Friedrich Delitzsch; Schaff-Herzog, Art. *Nineveh and Assyria*; Riehm's *Handwörterbuch des Biblischen Alterthums*, Art. *Ninive* by Hitzig; Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible*, Art. *Nineveh*, by Layard.

more complicated and is as syllabic, consisting of about 100 characters to express syllables like *ap*, *ik*, *na*, *bar*, and the *Assyro-Babylonian*, the most complicated, which comprises more than 400 characters, partly syllabic and partly ideographic.

How came the Assyrians and Babylonians to employ so peculiar and, as we shall see, so difficult a system of writing? It is now well established that they were not its inventors. The earliest known inscriptions in the cuneiform character are in the language of the Accadians, a cultivated people of Babylonia, whom the Semites supplanted more than 2,000 years B. C. To them the origin of this system is probably due, and from them the Semites derived it along with other elements of civilization, simply adapting it to the expression of their own wholly different language and bringing it to a higher degree of perfection.

Originally it was a picture writing. Each character was an ideograph, representing an object in rude outlines; and this is still apparent in many characters. In course of time, however, the characters became simplified and the resemblance to the object originally denoted was lost; but by the help of the archaic Babylonian forms it is often possible to restore the primitive form and thus detect the likeness to the object signified. The characters, however, represented not merely external objects by rude pictures, but also ideas by a kind of symbolism. "Life," for example, was metaphorically expressed by a growing flower. Moreover, two or more ideographs could be combined to symbolize new ideas. Thus the ideograph for "water" placed within the ideograph for "mouth" represented the act of "drinking," and the ideograph for "water" placed before the ideograph for the "eye" represented a "tear."

Accordingly the cuneiform system of writing was in the beginning a language for the eye only. It consisted of a multitude of signs representing objects and ideas. And it continued to have this character in part as long as it was used, till about the time of Alexander's conquest.¹ Some signs were employed

¹ Cuneiform writing has been found as late as Domitian. See Sayce's *Herodotus*, p. 363.

only as ideographs, appealing to the sight and not to the hearing; such as the eight-rayed star which represented a god. But at a very early period already, the picture-origin of these signs was forgotten, and there grew out of this picture-writing a syllabary. Each sign came to be associated with the sound of the word which it primarily or most usually denoted; and as at this time the Accadian language had, by phonetic decay and especially by the loss of final sounds, become mainly monosyllabic, the signs came to represent such syllables as *al*, *il*, *ul*, *ba*, *bi*, *bu*, *kam*, *ra*k, *lu*b. The system thus became syllabic as well as ideographic.

Moreover, the same character might be an ideograph, denoting an object or idea, and at the same time have the phonetic value of a particular syllable. Thus a certain character, consisting of three wedges, two horizontal and one perpendicular, is the ideograph for "God," and also stands for the syllable *an*. Indeed, each sign might have several ideographic values, since kindred objects might be represented by a single character. For example, the ideograph for the "eye" means also the "face" and "to see." And as each of the ideas represented by a single sign was naturally denoted by a different word in Accadian, each sign might have several phonetic values; as, for instance, the sign for the "eye," might also stand for the syllables *si*, *in* or *lim*.

This is that remarkable feature of the cuneiform system called polyphony, which created such astonishment at the time of its discovery, and naturally led men to doubt the very possibility of ever deciphering inscriptions in this strange, complicated writing. Yet the fact of polyphony is beyond all doubt. It is authenticated by the Assyrians themselves. Among the ruins of the palace of Assurbanipal have been found a number of clay tablets containing syllabaries in which are given two, three, four and even more ideographic and phonetic values for a single character. In 1851, Sir Henry Rawlinson determined the phonetic values of a certain character as *ni* and *tsal*; and in 1853, two years later, a syllabary containing this very character was

discovered, and lo! the identical values as determined by Rawlinson are given by the Assyrians themselves. Is it possible to present a more splendid proof of man's ingenuity?

Indeed, the decipherment of the cuneiform inscriptions is one of the most brilliant achievements of the human mind. It was not known at first whether they were really inscriptions or only fanciful ornaments. It was not known in what direction they were to be read, whether horizontally or perpendicularly, whether from right to left or from left to right. It was not known in what language they were written, or even to what family the language belonged, whether it was Semitic, or Turanian, or Aryan. There was not a single clue to the mystery of these strange characters. And yet to-day, only eighty years after Grotefend deciphered two small Persian inscriptions, the Assyriologist reads cuneiform writing with as much ease as the Hebrew scholar reads a moderately difficult text in the Old Testament.

It will be remembered that there are three species of cuneiform writing: Persian, Median and Assyrian. The Persian inscriptions were first deciphered, the key to them having been discovered by Grotefend as early as the year 1802. But the Assyro-Babylonian inscriptions continued to baffle the ingenuity of scholars until, in 1837, Sir Henry Rawlinson discovered the great trilingual inscription at Behistun, in which Darius Hystaspis relates the events of his whole life, and which is engraved on a rock in Media, in the language and writing of the Persians, the Medes and the Assyrians. This rendered the same assistance in the decipherment of the Assyrian writing, as the famous Rosetta stone, with its trilingual inscription in the hieroglyphic, the demotic and the Greek character, rendered to Champollion in the decipherment of the Egyptian hieroglyphic writing. The Persian proper names of the first species gave the pronunciation of many characters in the Assyrian species, and in this way became the key to the whole Assyro-Babylonian writing and language. De Saulcy determined the simple values of a large number of signs, detected the syllabic character of the

writing, and established the Semitic character of the language. And when these first steps had been accomplished, the progress of decipherment became rapid. For help was found in the inscriptions themselves, some of which are bilingual and trilingual, while others are parallel texts in the same language, and still others furnish syllabaries and vocabularies drawn up by the Assyrians themselves. During the last few decades, a number of scholars, especially in England, Germany and France, have pursued the study with such noble enthusiasm and amazing success, that to-day the science of Assyriology is firmly established, and the decipherment of the inscriptions on the monuments of Babylonia and Assyria is an accomplished fact.¹

Among the important results of Assyrian research is the recovery of several long-lost languages, especially the Accadian and Assyro-Babylonian. The Accadian was the language of the primitive inhabitants of Babylonia, who built the most ancient cities mentioned in the Bible, invented the cuneiform system of writing, and reached a high degree of civilization, which the Semites at a later time inherited. It was an agglutinative language, like that of the Turks. The earliest known cuneiform inscriptions were written in it, and, when they were written, it had already fallen into a state of phonetic decay. Gradually supplanted by a language of the Semitic family, it became extinct as long ago as, and perhaps much earlier than, the eighteenth century before Christ. It was, indeed, studied in the seventh century before our era, at the court of Assurbanipal; but it was studied as we study the languages of Greece and Rome. And now, after having been buried for more than three millenniums, it has, strange to say, been raised from its grave by the scholarship of the present age.

The language by which it was superseded was that of the

¹ On the *Cuneiform Writing and its Decipherment*, see *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Art. *Inscriptions (Cuneiform)*, by Sayce; *Riehm's Handwörterbuch*, Art. *Assyrien*, by Schrader; *Bibel-Lexicon*, Art. *Keilschrift*, by Schrader; *Schaff-Herzog*, Art. *Cuneiform Inscriptions*, by Francis Brown; *Lenormant's Ancient History of the East*, 1869, pp. 431-444.

Babylonians and Assyrians, who spoke the same tongue with only dialectic differences. It belongs to the Semitic family. It is Semitic in all its features: in its trilateral roots and its internal inflection; in the formation of its verbal and nominal stems; in its two tenses, the perfect and the imperfect, though the former has greatly fallen into disuse; in the preformatives of the imperfect to express the persons of the verb; in its nominal and verbal suffixes; and in its construct state to denote the genitive relation. The Hebrew scholar who takes up a transliterated Assyrian text will at once recognize in the great body of the words the roots and formations with which he has become familiar in the Old Testament.

Yet the Assyrian has its peculiarities. It differs in some of its features from all its Semitic sisters. Fortunately for Biblical science, it is most closely related to the Hebrew. It has some points of resemblance to the Æthiopic, and still more to the Arabic, while it is furthest removed from the Aramaic. This is a topic, however, on which, tempting as it is, I shall not linger, well knowing that it would not be interesting, even if it should be intelligible, to a considerable portion of this audience.¹

In this Assyrian language and in this peculiar system of writing, there was embodied a large amount of literature which is now being brought to the light. This literature was, for the most part, recorded on clay tablets of various sizes, from a square inch upward, stamped while yet moist in minute characters, and afterwards baked in kilns. Such were the books of the ancient Assyrians and Babylonians, if books they may be called. They were kept with great care, by regular librarians, in chambers set apart for the reception of the tablets. More-

¹ On the *Accadian and Assyrian Languages*, see *Assyrian Grammar for Comparative Purposes*, by Sayce, 1872; *Elementary Grammar with full Syllabary and Progressive Reading Book of the Assyrian Language in the Cuneiform Type*, by A. H. Sayce, 2d ed.; *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Art. *Babylonia*; *Bibel-Lexicon*, Art. *Keilschrift*; *Riehm's Handwörterbuch*, Art. *Assyrien*; *The Importance of Assyriology to Hebrew Lexicography*, by Fred. Delitzsch, Athenæum, May 12, 1883.

over, they were arranged in series according to the subjects, each series being provided with a title, and consisting in some cases of not less than 100 tablets; and, as we learn from the catalogue of the library of Agade, they were all numbered, so that when a student wanted a tablet, he had but to write down its number and hand it to the librarian. Every city of any importance in ancient Babylonia, and later in Assyria, had at least one library. The earliest known to us was at Larsa, the modern Senkereh; the largest was the royal library of Assyria, founded at Calah, the modern Nimroud, by Assurnatsirpal, in the first half of the ninth century, and enlarged by successive monarchs, especially by Sargon, 722 B. C., and his son Sennacherib, 705 B. C., who removed it to Nineveh, the modern Kouyunjik, where it remained till the fall of the empire, and where Assurbanipal, 670 B. C., the greatest of the Assyrian monarchs and a magnificent patron of learning, made larger additions to it than all the preceding kings combined.

We can hardly form an estimate of the extent of this ancient literature; but that it was very large becomes more evident with each fresh discovery. A few years ago there were found two fragments belonging to two separate copies of a list of the ancient epics and legends of Chaldea, with the names of their reputed authors. They furnish us with a catalogue of twenty-eight of these early poems; and yet they are only fragments of the list, and fragments, unfortunately, of the same part of the list, so that we are ignorant of much it originally contained; and when, besides, we remember that none of these old epics and legends is later than about 2000 B. C., we see how numerous they must have been and how few of them we possess.¹ It is estimated that there were in the royal library at Nineveh over 10,000 inscribed tablets, treating of almost every branch of knowledge existing at that time.

For it must be understood that the Assyrian and Babylonian literature was rich and varied. It was not simply

¹ See *The Chaldean Account of Genesis* by George Smith; Rev. Ed. by Sayce, pp. x-xiii.

religious, but scientific, historical and poetic as well. That you may know the wide range of subjects treated, let us glance for a moment at the contents of the great library at Nineveh—a library which was the growth of centuries and which had gathered into itself the literary treasures of Babylon, Borsippa, Cuthar, Agade, Ur, Erech, Larsa, Nipur and various other cities of the ancient world. On the subject of astronomy and astrology, it contained, besides less important works, many copies of the celebrated work, in 72 books, entitled “The Illumination of Bel,” which was the standard authority on this science till the end of the Assyrian empire, though it was compiled by order of Sargon I., a great patron of learning and the founder of the library at Agade, whose date, however incredible it may seem, is now known, from late wonderful discoveries by Rassam, to be 3800 B. C. There were also mathematical works, containing calculations, tables of cube and square roots, and tables of measures. There were works on natural history, giving bilingual lists of animals, trees and plants, regularly classified according to the supposed nature and affinities of the species. There were works on grammar and lexicography, with lists of words in Accadian and Assyrian, paradigms of declension and conjugation, reading-books and interlinear translations of Accadian texts. There were geographical works, containing lists of countries and their productions, of cities, rivers, mountains and peoples. There were historical works, containing chronological lists of kings and annual officers, treaties, proclamations, and reports on civil and military affairs. There were works containing laws and law-cases, records of sale and barter, wills and loans. There were lyric poems, which for depth of feeling and piety are unequalled except by the Psalms of the Old Testament, to which, moreover, they bear a close resemblance in form and arrangement; and there was also epic poetry, which was supposed hitherto to be altogether lacking among the Semitic nations. Finally, there were religious works, with my-

thologic legends, with hymns and prayers, and with charms against sickness and evil spirits.¹

This brief table of the contents of a single library may give you some idea, however inadequate, of the Assyrian literature, whose treasures are now being disclosed to the world. It is an extremely ancient literature; for Assurbanipal's library contained for the most part only copies of originals, dating from before Moses, and even before Abraham. It is a literature that was once very extensive; for what we have already recovered in so short a time is, according to Delitzsch, three times greater in extent than the Old Testament—a literature written in a language closely allied to the Hebrew—a literature of a people dwelling in the very region from which the Hebrews originally came, and with whom, from the eighth century on, they were brought into close historical relations. Is it strange, therefore, that to such a literature the eye of the Biblical scholar should turn with the expectation that it will shed light on many a dark place in the Old Testament? Nor has this expectation been disappointed, even though Assyriology is only in its infancy. Few except professional Biblical scholars are aware what rich results for Old Testament science the researches among the cuneiform inscriptions have already yielded. To set forth these results fully would require much time. I can only turn your attention to a few, especially such as may be of general interest to the non-Semitic scholar.

As regards the language of the Old Testament, much help has already been derived, and still more may be confidently expected, from the new science of Assyriology. There are many who think that the Assyrian language will be to Semitic philology, what the Sanscrit has been to Aryan philology,—the key to unlock its secrets. This may prove to be a

¹ On *Assyrian and Babylonian Literature*, see *The Chaldean Account of Genesis*, ch. ii.; Riehm's *Handwörterbuch*, Art. *Assyrien*; *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Art. *Babylonia and Assyria*; Lenormant's *Ancient History of the East*, pp. 444-451; *Die Assyriologie und ihre Ergebnisse für die vergleichende Religionsgeschichte*, von Prof. Tiele.

mistake. At least, it seems clear that the primitive Semitic type has best been preserved in the form and structure of the Arabic. But there is no mistake as to the invaluable service the Assyrian language is able to render to a fuller and better knowledge of the Hebrew. It may surprise you, that a language which, like that of the Old Testament, has been the object of thorough study by Jew and Christian for more than two thousand years, should present any uncertainty as to the meaning of its words. Yet it is a fact that there are many words in Hebrew whose true sense is very doubtful. They are in general, words that occur but once, or at least rarely, such as the names of many animals, plants and precious stones. There are others, however, in quite common use, whose explanation is very unsatisfactory. In such cases, when the internal helps derived from the context and parallel passages fail, it is necessary to resort to external helps. We may go to the old versions, especially to the Septuagint, made in the third century before Christ, and to the Targums, which, perhaps, in their oral, though not in their written form, antedate the Christian era. But we shall generally be disappointed, for, however valuable they are in some respects for the interpretation of the text, their translation of doubtful words is too often due to a mere guess. They display unmistakable signs of an imperfect knowledge of the Old Hebrew, which, when these versions were made, was practically dead.

Some scholars have sought to explain obscure words of the Old Testament from the Persian, the Egyptian, or even the Sanscrit. That is all very well, if the words in question are loan-words from those languages. But those languages can throw no light on the meaning of purely Semitic words. Generally, however, where the sense of a Hebrew word is uncertain, the lexicographer has recourse to the Arabic, forgetful that, while the Arabic has to a greater extent than the other Semitic languages retained the original forms of words, it has not, as is evident from the mere copiousness of its vocabulary, retained their original meanings, or at all events, it has developed the original meaning into a multitude of other meanings.

Under these circumstances, what is more natural than that, in view of the close affinity of the Assyrian to the Hebrew, we should seek in that the explanation of obscure words in this? It is certain that hereafter no Hebrew dictionary can be written without making the fullest use of the aids afforded by the Assyrian. How much obscurity it has already cleared up!

It gives us the explanation of many proper and official names. We now know, for example, that "Esarhaddon" means "Assur has given a brother," though Gesenius in the early editions of his lexicon regards it as the equivalent of the Persian *Athro-dāna*, "gift of fire." So the name "Abel" signifies "son," as we learn from the Assyrian, not "breath," as formerly explained. The name "Adam" has commonly been connected with *adamah*, "the ground," and would thus signify "the earth-born," though its etymology, like that of *homo*, has been regarded by the best scholars as uncertain. Various explanations have been proposed, until now Delitzsch tells us that in Assyrian its verbal root signifies, like *banah*, "to build," or "to beget," so that *Adam*, "man," is synonymous with *ben*, "son," and means "the begotten one," or "the created one."

In like manner the signification of many geographical names is made clear. "Babel," to take a single example, does not mean "confusion"; for that meaning is given to it in Genesis only by a play upon the word, such as the writers of the Old Testament, prophets as well as historians, were fond of. "Babel" is the Assyrian *Bab-ilu*, "the gate of God."

Moreover, words which were regarded as proper names of persons are now seen to be official names, and receive a satisfactory explanation. Twice in the Authorized Version of the Old Testament (2 Kings xviii. 17 and Is. xx. 1), we read of "Tartan," as if that was the proper name of an individual, whereas the *Tartan*, which simply means "commander," was the title of the general-in-chief of the Assyrian army. "Rabshakeh" is likewise an official title, and means, not "chief butler," but "chief of the officers."

Some words which were supposed to be of Persian, Egyptian

or Greek origin are now proved from the cuneiform inscriptions to be Semitic. Others, which occur but once or rarely, and which have always presented peculiar difficulties to the commentator, are made abundantly plain by the Assyrian, which sometimes preserves a word or root whose equivalent has dropped out of the other Semitic dialects. And not unfrequently it supplies the true etymology of words of the most common occurrence. But to give illustrations of these statements, as has recently been done by Delitzsch, would tax your time, and, I fear, your patience, too much.¹

As regards the geography and ethnology of the Old Testament, we have received from the monuments much new and valuable information. Many names of countries, cities and peoples mentioned in the Bible have hitherto been shrouded in impenetrable darkness; but a considerable number of these is now being brought into the clear light of history.

What a splendid commentary on the table of nations in the tenth chapter of Genesis the cuneiform inscriptions have proved! Take, for instance, verses 10-12, where it is said of Nimrod that "the beginning of his kingdom was Babel, and Erech, and Accad, and Calneh, in the land of Shinar. Out of that land went forth Asshur, and builded Nineveh, and the city Rehoboth, and Calah, and Resen between Nineveh and Calah: the same is a great city." Until the last few decades we were in almost complete ignorance of nearly everything in this statement. We knew, indeed, from the classic historians something of Nineveh and Babylon; but all the rest was matter of conjecture. The monuments, however, have put us in a position to understand the sacred writer. From them we learn that Babylonia, as distinguished from Assyria, was divided into two parts, Sumer and Accad, and that its primitive inhabitants were a Turanian people, who built its cities, founded its culture, and invented its system of writing. This corresponds with

¹ On the *Importance of Assyrian to Hebrew Lexicography*, see the valuable series of articles by Friedrich Delitzsch in the *Athenæum*, May 5, 12, 26; June 9; July 21, 28; Aug. 25, 1883; since published in book form.

what is said in Genesis of the earliest civilization as Cushite; for Nimrod was the son of Cush. But at an early period, certainly not later than the third millennium before the Christian era, the Semites, leaving their original home in Arabia, and migrating northward, founded a settlement in Babylonia, where, after a long struggle with the native population, whose culture they adopted, they gradually gained the supremacy. Now the land of Shinar, in which the four cities of Nimrod's kingdom lay, is Sumer, by which name the writer of Genesis designates the whole of Babylonia, including Accad. For although Sumer proper was only the southwest half of Babylonia, yet as it was the seat of the Semites from among whom Abraham went forth to Canaan, the Hebrews at a later time gave the name Sumer or Shinar, to the whole of that country which is often named on the monuments as Sumer and Accad.¹

Of the four cities which constituted the beginning of Nimrod's kingdom, Babel is the *Bab-ilu* of the monuments, the later Babylon, whose situation on the Euphrates is well known. Erech is named *Arku* in the inscriptions, and is the modern Warka, on the east bank of the lower Euphrates below Babylon. It was the seat of a very ancient culture, and apparently the necropolis of the Babylonians. Accad is known as yet only as the name of a territory and people in Babylonia; and Calneh has not been identified, though the name occurs on the twelfth tablet of the Izdubar Epic.²

However, only the beginning of Nimrod's kingdom was in the land of Shinar. He went forth, we are told, out of that land to Asshur, that is Assyria; for so the Hebrew should probably be translated, and not as in the Authorized Version: "Out of that land went forth Asshur." It is now a well-established fact that, politically, as well as in its entire culture, writing and religion, Assyria was originally dependent on Babylonia. This is, indeed, in contradiction to the classic historians; but the Biblical statement is confirmed by the monuments. Asshur is here distinguished from the land of

¹ Riehm's *Handwörterbuch*. Art. *Sinear*.

² *The Chaldean Account of Genesis*, Sayce's Ed. p. 313.

Shinar, and the name is used accordingly in its original geographical, not in its later political sense. The four cities named, Nineveh, Rehoboth, Calah and Resen, were not scattered throughout the wide Assyrian empire, as was formerly supposed, but lay close together in a confined district on the east side of the Tigris: Nineveh, in the narrower sense of the word, was situated, as we have seen, opposite Mosul at Kouyunjik and Nebi Yunus. Calah lay to the south, and is the present Nimroud. Resen, named only here in the Bible, was situated between Nineveh and Calah, and though the name in the form *Res eni*, "head of the spring," is given in the twelfth tablet of the Izdubar Epic, which mentions so many of the oldest known cities, its site has not been identified. Rehoboth-Ir, properly "the broad places of the city," and not, as in our version, "the city of Rehoboth," was, if we may judge from the name, a suburb of Nineveh; but in what direction it lay has not been determined. Again we are told: "The same was a great city." This refers not to Resen, but to the tetrapolis, or to Nineveh in the broad sense, as including the other three cities. As described by the ancient historians, Nineveh formed a quadrangle 150 stadia by 90 stadia, though at the time Genesis x. 8-12 was written, it had evidently not reached its full extent of sixty miles circuit; for the writer makes no mention of Khorsabad, which at a later time formed the North city, as Calah formed the South city of Nineveh the Great.¹

We are told that Abraham started for Canaan from Ur of the Chaldees. It is important for historical reasons to ascertain where Ur was situated. Ancient tradition is not agreed. One tradition, perhaps the most ancient and wide-spread, identified it with the modern Orfah, called by the Greeks Edessa; another, found in the Talmud, identified Ur with the modern Warka, which we have just seen to be the Erech of the Bible; and a third connects it with the ruins of Mugheir, south of Babylon, on the right bank of the Euphrates. And the monu-

¹ On the *Table of Nations* see Schrader, *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*, 2d ed.; Dillmann, *Die Genesis*, 4th Ed.

ments have at length settled the question in favor of Mugheir. Here, in lower Babylonia, the Shinar of Genesis, the Semites found a home at a very early period; but at different times there were migrations northward. First the Phœnicians journeyed as far as Canaan, where they were settled before the arrival of Abraham; then, the Hebrews set out to find other seats, and, after tarrying awhile in Mesopotamia, crossed the Jordan; and finally, the Assyrians located about the city of Asshur, the modern Kileh Sherghat, and, at a later time, in and about Nineveh. In this we have the explanation of several otherwise perplexing facts, viz., the almost perfect identity of the old Phœnician and Hebrew languages¹, and the close relationship between the Hebrew and the Assyrian. Indeed, the name Abram, who went forth from Ur of the Chaldees is found in this form in the Assyrian inscriptions.

Lastly, Assyrian research is of special importance for Old Testament chronology and history. As to chronology I shall say but a word, well-knowing from personal experience that the subject is dry and uninteresting. You are aware that the history in the books of Kings, from the death of Solomon to the fall of Samaria, is written synchronistically and provided with a double series of dates. But unhappily these dates, as every Biblical scholar knows, are encumbered with numerous and apparently insoluble difficulties. There are frequent inconsistencies, which necessitate certain changes of numbers. But what numbers shall be changed; and on what principle shall the changes be made? Here each chronologer is governed by his individual opinion, and no two agree in their emendations. It would seem, that in reconstructing the chronology of the books of Kings, the help of records outside of the Bible is indispensable, or, at least, very important.

Such records the Assyrian monuments furnish us. "The Assyrians early possessed a fixed chronology, reckoned by the names of officers called *limmi*, who were changed every year, and,

¹ See Stade's *Erneute Prüfung des zwischen dem Phöniciſchen und Hebräiſchen beſtehenden Verwandtschaftsgrades*, in *Morgenländische Forschungen*.

like the eponymous archons at Athens, gave their name to their year of office. The chief events of each year were added to the name of its eponym, and in the earlier period of the empire the king himself assumed the office in his year of accession. We possess fragments of several editions of the Canon in which the names of the eponyms were recorded in order, and thus have an exact chronology of the empire from B. c. 913 to B. c. 659."¹ Similar chronological lists once existed, according to Sayce for the earlier period also, since an inscription of a king of the 14th century B. c. is dated by one of these eponymies; and the precise dates given in the inscriptions for events in the reigns of older monarchs cannot otherwise be accounted for. Now, it can readily be seen that, if so exact a chronology as the Assyrian could be recovered, it would be of invaluable service in settling the chronology of the Old Testament.

It would be pleasant as well as profitable to trace out the connection between the monuments of Assyria and the history of Israel. Time, however, will only allow me to touch on a few points. It is interesting to learn that the Israelites came into contact with the Assyrians at a much earlier time than was formerly supposed. Pul is the first Assyrian monarch mentioned in the Bible. But we now know from the annals of Shalmaneser (858-823), especially from the obelisk of black basalt in the British Museum, that he not only defeated a dangerous conspiracy, which was headed by Ben-Hadad of Damascus and included Ahab of Israel, and somewhat later in his reign annihilated the forces of Hazael, Ben-Hadad's successor, but that he also extorted tribute from the princes of Palestine, amongst others from Jehu of Samaria, whose servants are depicted on the black obelisk.

From the beginning of Shalmaneser's reign, the Assyrian monuments are in constant connection with Biblical history. The names of the Assyrian and Babylonian monarchs mentioned in the Old Testament, are all found in the cuneiform inscrip-

¹ Sayce's *Herodotus*, p. 365.

tions with the exception of Pul, who is identified by some with Tiglath-Pileser, but by others regarded as a pretender to the throne, who, though he acquired supremacy in the west and south, was never acknowledged at Nineveh. The official titles of Assyrian officers, Tartan, Rab-saris, Rab-shakeh, and Rab-mag, given in the Bible, are likewise found on the monuments, by means of which alone they can be explained. Moreover, most of the kings of Israel and of Judah, from Jehu onward, are named in the annals of the Assyrian and Babylonian kings, not less than five being mentioned in those of Tiglath-Pileser alone.

It must be apparent to all, how very valuable the Assyrian history as recorded on the monuments is for comparison with Biblical history, which, so far from suffering from the comparison, is found more and more, with the progress of research, to be trustworthy and accurate. An illustration or two will make this evident.¹

In Gen. xiv we are told, that Chedorlaomer, king of Elam, in the time of Abraham, made an expedition against the five kings of the Jordan valley, and after having defeated them in battle, was himself defeated by Abraham, the uncle of Lot whom they had led captive. The historical character of this narrative has been much questioned, especially by Nöldeke, who maintains that it is a fiction invented to glorify the patriarch as a mighty warrior.² Now, it is true, that we do not find on the monuments either the name of Chedorlaomer or the event here recorded; but we do find that which justifies us in regarding the story, not as a myth, but as genuine history. In the first place, we find both parts of his name. Several of the Elamite kings bore names compounded with *Kudur*, meaning "servant;" as *Kudur-Mabug* and *Kudur-Nankhunte*; and *Laomer* or *Lagamar* (LXX Λαγομάρ) is the name of an Elamite god. In the second place, as an Elamite king, *Kudur-Nankhunte*, in the

¹ On the connection between *O. Test. History and the Assyrian Monuments*, see especially Schrader's *Keilinschriften und das alte Testament*.

² *Die Ungeschichtlichkeit der Erzählung Gen. xiv in his Untersuchungen*.

year 2285 B. C., as we know from Assur-bani-pal's inscriptions, made a predatory incursion into Babylonia, so it is not improbable that another Elamite king, Kudur-Lagamar (Chedorlaomer) penetrated still further west, even as far as Palestine, especially as the third Elamite king, Kudur-Mabug, according to his own inscription, took possession of "the land of the west," which everywhere on the monuments means Canaan. Is it possible to find stronger indirect testimony in favor of the truth of any narrative?¹

One other instance out of many of the remarkable confirmation of the Bible by the monuments must suffice. In Is. xx. 1, we read of a certain Sargon, king of Assyria. He is named only this once in all Scripture, and then, not in a historical book, nor is he ever mentioned by any ancient writer except here by Isaiah. This singular silence naturally led scholars to suppose that he was not a king distinct from those named in the historical books of the Old Testament, but rather, one of these under a different name. Some identified him with Shalmaneser, others with Sennacherib, and still others with Esarhaddon. He was none of these, but the king who in 722 B. C. succeeded Shalmaneser, and in 705 B. C. was followed by his son Sennacherib, and who during his brilliant reign of 17 years victoriously carried his arms south to Babylonia and Susiana, east to Media, north to Armenia and Cappadocia, west to Syria and Palestine, and southwest to Egypt. How strange that he, the mighty monarch, the successful warrior, the builder of splendid structures, and the magnificent patron of learning and the arts, should be forgotten and remain utterly unknown, until his own annals, covering 15 years of his reign, were a few years ago read on the monuments of Assyria.

Here I am reluctantly compelled to close, leaving untouched, for want of time, the extremely interesting parallelism between the cuneiform records and the early chapters of Genesis, especially the account of the flood, which forms the eleventh tablet of the Izdubar Epic. I have said nothing of the import-

¹ Biehlm's Handwörterbuch, art. *Chedorlaomer*.

ance of Assyriology for history in general; I have spoken only of the value of its results for Old Testament science. And if in this field so much has been accomplished in so brief a time, what may we not expect in the future, seeing that almost every day brings with it some new discovery? At all events, if we may judge of that future by the past, we may rest assured that the progress of Assyrian research will not only cast an ever brighter light on the pages of the Old Testament, but will also furnish fresh confirmation of its divine character and truth.¹

¹ Since this Address was written I have received Hommel's *Die Semitischen Völker und Sprachen* which treats of many of the topics above discussed.

III.

FOREORDINATION AND FATALISM.

BY TALBOT W. CHAMBERS, D. D.

Do these two words mean two different things, or do they express merely two different aspects of the same thing? The latter view seems to be quite generally entertained. It is not uncommon when the truth respecting the divine sovereignty is set forth with clearness and force to hear the remark made even by some who profess to hold the doctrines of grace, "Why, that is fatalism." A number of years ago an Episcopalian clergyman was urging a friend in another denomination to read *Comte's Positive Philosophy*, and he thought that he clinched his argument by saying, "You surely ought to study the book, for it sustains your Calvinistic views throughout, giving them a definite logical basis." By which he meant that Comte's doctrine of a fixed chain of physical causation which man is utterly unable to explain and of which he can study only the phenomena, is the same as the sovereign control of the universe by a personal God. Nay, more, in the *Theory of Morals*, a work issued only last year, by M. Paul Janet, the famous writer on *Final Causes*, the author speaks of Fatalism as being found to exist in three forms, the first of which is the *fatum Mahometanum*, belief in an occult power and in a sort of magic stronger than any special causes, and the third is the geometric or Spinozian fatalism, according to which all the phenomena of the universe, consequently all human actions, arise from the nature of things just as inevitably as the nature of the triangle arises

from the equality of its three angles to two right angles. Between these two and as belonging precisely to the same category he places "theological fatalism or the doctrine of *predestination*," which he thinks and says involves the same inconvenient results as the others, and gives God the appearance of a tyrant, who acts from mere caprice, and who relies on His power, instead of on justice. And he holds that it denies the existence of free will, just as much as Islamism or Spinozism.

It is the merits of this proposition which it is now proposed to consider. It is admitted, of course, that there are points of resemblance between the two theories of Foreordination and Fatalism, for otherwise it would hardly be possible to confound them. They agree in denying the existence of chance as a factor in human life, or as denoting anything more than the occurrence of results the causes of which are unknown. The most superficial and unsatisfactory of all theories of the universe is that which traces the phenomena to merely accidental concurrences, for where this theory removes one difficulty it brings in a dozen more to take its place. The two views agree, also, in recognizing a physical and moral order in the world in consequence of which sequences of events follow with infallible certainty, so that the end can be foreseen from the beginning and there is an issue toward which all things tend and at which they are sure one day to arrive. But here the agreement of the two views ceases. Henceforth they differ widely. The difference is seen in the way in which the fixed order of events is regarded in respect to its origin, its character and its ultimate end.

1. As to *Origin*. The fate of the ancient Greeks had no definite moral character. Its ordinary name *εἰμαρμένη* indeed denoted etymologically that which is allotted or decreed. And the same may be said of the Latin *fatum*, which (from *for*, to speak) originally meant only a prophetic declaration, and in this sense its English derivative has often been employed by good writers. An illustration is afforded by a well known hymn of Charles Wesley, beginning, "Lo, on a narrow neck of

land." The latter half of the second stanza runs thus, speaking of eternal things,

Give me to feel their solemn weight,
And tremble on the brink of fate,
And wake to righteousness.

But some ignorant reviser, supposing that the poet must needs have intended to use the word fate in its heathen sense, took it upon him in jealousy for the truth to alter the last two lines in this way :

And save me ere it be too late ;
Wake me to righteousness.

Thus ruining at once the sense and the poetry, for how possibly could a man be saved unless it were done before it was too late, and what a vast descent is there from the fine figure of the poet to the flat and prosaic utterance of the hymn-tinker ! But in practical use among the heathen the sense of "oracle" passed into that of destiny, or an eternal and immutable order of nature. And the term came to denote both among philosophers and among the vulgar a blind force which lay behind the actings alike of gods and of men, and was sovereign and irresistible. Its determinations did not admit of investigation or of criticism, and were to be received with submission simply because no other course was possible. The same thing may be said of the necessity adopted by Spinoza and the materialists.

They hold that the reign of law is absolute, universal and perpetual, but they mean by law not the expression of the will of a superior, but merely a mode of action. And this if not blind and unintelligent is as nearly as possible of that character, for it takes no account of individuals, all of whom act and must act according to the way in which outward circumstances press upon their mental and moral condition at any given moment. Environment determines character, yet no account can be given of the cause or the reason of this environment. From this the fate of the Mohammedans differs only in name and appearance. They indeed understand by fate the will of God, but it is that will conceived simply as the expression of absolute power and

divested of all moral qualities. *Kismet* to a Moslem is precisely what *Eimarmene* was to the ancient Greek, *i. e.*, an outward, absolute and irresponsible determination, into which no inquiry could be made and of which no account could be given. And this is what fate means always and everywhere. How different on the other hand, is Foreordination! This postulates in the very first place a personal God, who is creator and preserver, and therefore ruler of all things. Nothing ever happens or can happen without His direction or permission. This is a direct result not simply of His power as absolute and unlimited but of the entire assembly of His perfections. We cannot conceive of the infinite Mind acting otherwise than in accordance with its own nature. Therefore the universe is not left to itself, or made the sport of chance, or wrought into a machine, but is controlled and governed by a sovereign purpose which is wise, holy and good. This purpose is also unchangeable and eternal, for how can it be otherwise? Change if made must be for the better, or for the worse, or for no reason at all. If for the first mentioned cause, then the maker of it was not God before; if for either of the two latter, He ceases to be God. Hence the sequences of events become certain. Some insist that we should say necessary, but this is a word easily misunderstood and therefore to be avoided. All that foreordination implies or requires is that the future should be made certain. Hence we insist that to say that this intelligent, wise and rational control exercised by a personal God of boundless perfection is the same as unintelligent and irrational Fate, is an abuse of words of which thinking men ought to be ashamed.

2. The same thing is shown in reference to the *character* of the control that is exercised by Foreordination and Fate respectively.

The latter is an iron rule which embraces all things in its grasp and governs them in the same way. It makes no distinction between good and evil, but insures the occurrence of each with entire impartiality. Inexorable destiny determines alike the commission of crimes and the exercise of virtue. But

foreordination is careful here to make a distinction. It represents good as decreed, but evil merely as permitted. It rejects with horror even the thought that God is the author of sin.

Again, Fatalism takes no account of man as a free moral agent. It swallows up every lower law of activity and allows no scope to freedom of development in human nature. Whether it be conceived as the vast machine of the universe moving on in a mighty resistless course, or as the mysterious decree of the *Parcæ*,

that hold the vital shears
And turn the adamantine spindle round,
On which the fate of gods and men is wound,

determining the lot of each individual of the race, it is in both cases something which affects man from the outside, which is quite independent of his character or his wishes, and which leaves him no choice but submission or despair. Its terrible bearing upon all human sufferers is well set forth in the fate of Oedipus, the favorite theme of the Greek tragic poets. He was a kind husband, a good father, a wise king, nay, a public benefactor, but all was vain. A curse hung over him from his birth, and whatever he might be or do that was praiseworthy, the fearful doom must be wrought out. Foreordination, on the contrary, is neither blind nor irrational. It does indeed secure that God shall reign in His own universe, and that His purposes shall be accomplished, but this is not produced by an arbitrary will dealing with men as though they were blocks of stone or wood, but by a power acting in entire consistency with their nature as intelligent and responsible. It not only admits but insists upon the existence of second causes. (See Westminster Confession of Faith, chap. iii. 1). Good men and bad men are subject to it, but by no means in the same way. Bad men are simply left to themselves to follow their own way, and so far from being impelled of God to wickedness, the Synod of Dort declares the very thought of such a thing is blasphemy. Nor are they robbed of their liberty, although it be true that sometimes they are restrained by providential developments, and at

others have even their worst actions so overruled that the wrath of man is made to praise God, as was signally the case in the most stupendous crime in human history, the crucifixion of our Lord. Good men, on the other hand, owe their goodness to God. His eternal purpose works itself out in securing their repentance, conversion and holy living in such a way that while the efficient cause is in God they themselves feel and know that they are free in the choice of that which is good. The common version of the third verse of the 110th Psalm, while it is poor exegesis, is excellent theology. God's people "shall be willing in the day of his power," although this is not what David says according to the Hebrew.* Unwilling, compulsory believers are an unknown quantity. Indeed, it is God's electing grace which restores His servants to freedom. Previously they were under the bondage of sin, a yoke they were of themselves unable to throw off. The divine influence snaps the chains in which they were held, and breathes into the soul the requisite light and energy. Then first they reached true liberty. Conscience and inclination are reconciled, and they delight to do God's will, they run in the way of his commandments. They readily admit that it is God that worketh in them both to will and to work for His good pleasure (Phil. ii. 13 Rev. Ver.), but the result is the cheerful consent of their whole nature to the divine law and an eager desire to fulfil all its behests. Were it otherwise, were their obedience reluctant and constrained, it would be utterly rejected.

Now it is quite conceivable that persons may deny the doc-

*The clause literally rendered runs thus, "Thy people (shall be) freewill offerings in the day of thy martial host." Freewill offerings under the Mosaic ritual were those which were not prescribed by any statute nor required by virtue of any vow, but were spontaneous gifts of the pious Israelite. The sense then of the words is that in the day when this priestly King leads forth His forces to combat, His people, so far from being forced into the ranks by a conscription, will of their own accord crowd to the standard and consecrate their lives to their King. This of course not only admits but requires a spiritual application to Him whose Kingdom is not of this world, but that fact does not convert the words into a proof-text for dogma.

trine of foreordination on one ground or another, but it is every way unwarrantable for them to confound it with Fatalism, for the difference between them is as great as the difference between a machine and a man, a machine being the unconscious subject of natural forces while a man is the conscious subject of a moral government. Fate has no moral character itself and recognizes none in the beings upon whom it acts, while Foreordination has its very ground in the distinction between good and evil, and recognizes this distinction at every step of its progress.

3. Once more, the two things are widely separated by their *ultimate ends*. Fatalism has no such end nor any end at all. It is aimless. It is not merely inscrutable, but blind. It rolls down through the ages, here exalting one, there depressing another, insensible to prayers or tears, often disappointing the best human calculations, at times crushing the evil and the good, and yet without any fixed purpose or any definite goal at which it is to arrive. Most justly is it called blind. It is a Samson, deprived not only of his eyes, but of his reason. The old Stoics held that at the end of a certain cosmical period all things are reabsorbed into deity, the whole universe being resolved into fire in a general conflagration, after which the evolution of the world begins again. But each new world becomes, in consequence of the necessity which governs all things, in all respects similar to that which preceded. Thus there is a perpetual rise and decay of the existing system, but no advance, no progress, no final outcome in complete and abiding blessedness.

Quite as gloomy is the outlook of modern materialism, which sees nothing in the universe but the interworking of natural laws, becoming and unbecoming, evolution and degradation. One of its latest expositors distinctly declares that the same law which governs the growth, decline and fall of nations as well as individuals, extends to humanity as a whole. Hear the description found in Dr. Maudsley's *Body and Will* (pp. 319-20):

"If the force at the back of all becoming on earth is that which the sun has steadily supplied to it through eternal ages,

and still steadily supplies, it is plain that when it fails, as fail it one day must, there will be a steadily declining development and a rapidly increasing degeneration of things, an undoing by regressive decompositions of what has been done by progressive combinations through the succession of the ages. The disintegrating process may be expected to take effect first in the highest products of evolution and to reach in deepening succession the low, lower and lowest organizations and organic compounds. The nations that have risen high in complexity of development will degenerate and be broken up, to have their places taken by less complex associations of inferior individuals; they in turn will yield place to simpler and feebler unions of still more degraded beings; species after species of animals and plants will first degenerate and then become extinct, as the worsening conditions of life render it impossible for them to continue the struggle for existence; a few scattered families of degraded human beings, living perhaps in snow-huts near the equator, very much as the Esquimaux live now near the pole, will represent the last wave of the receding tide of human existence before its final extinction; until at last a frozen earth, incapable of cultivation, is left without energy to produce a living particle of any sort, and so death itself is dead."

This gloomy, horrible pessimism is the only legitimate result of all materialistic theories of the universe. If there be no controlling purpose, no guiding mind in One who sits in the heavens and sees the end from the beginning, no basis is left for intelligent hope as to the final outcome of all things. Even if the issue be not such a universal reign of death as Dr. Maudsley so calmly anticipates, it must be only a perpetual oscillation between the forces of good and evil, now one, now the other being dominant, and man in his best estate helpless and defenceless, either to aid the one or resist the other. All that is left for him is sheer submission to destiny, the acceptance of the inevitable with whatever grace he can command.

How different from this the Foreordination of scripture and reason! In its view there is a wise and holy moral order in the

world which moves on steadily to the accomplishment of a lofty purpose. It is not always apparent to men, and there are times when there seems to be retrogression rather than advance. Yet all who hold the doctrine are firm in the faith that the wise Ruler of the world will one day lead forth judgment unto victory and vindicate the kindness as well as the rectitude of His control. He foreordains, because otherwise there would be no security against the final triumph of evil. His foreordination is not capricious or arbitrary, but founded on the wisest reasons and aiming at the most glorious results. And believers in it have more ground than any other persons to take up the exulting song of the Psalmist, "The Lord reigneth—let the earth rejoice, let the multitude of the isles be glad thereof."

We may then claim that the case is made out. If two well-defined principles differ in their origin, their mode of operation and their final aim, it is only ignorance or effrontery that can confound them. Men may object to Foreordination on the ground of scripture or reason or experience, but they have not the shadow of a pretext for calling it Fatalism. To give it such a name is either the result of a superficial, unreflecting habit of thought, or else a deliberate contrivance to overthrow truth by associating it with what all Christians of every name agree in considering heathenish, debasing and odious.

IV.

THE DEMOSTHENIC OATH.

BY THE REV. J. SPANGLER KIEFFER.

'Αλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπάντων ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι, μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραταξαμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχῆσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ καὶ πολλοῖς ἑτέροις τοὺς ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις μνήμασι κειμένους ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, οὓς ἅπαντας ὁμοίως ἢ πόλις τῆς αὐτῆς ἀξιώσασα τιμῆς ἔθαψεν, Αἰσχίνῃ, οὐχι τοὺς κατορθώσαντας αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τοὺς κρατήσαντάς μόνους· δικαίως δ' μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργον, ἅπασι πέπρακται, τῇ τύχῃ δ', ἣν ὁ δαίμων ἐνειμὲν ἑκάστοις, ταύτῃ κέχρηται.—*Demosth. de Coronâ*, § 208.

OF those who by eloquence have wielded influence over their fellow-men, the greatest master is, by universal acknowledgment, Demosthenes. Of the orations of this great orator, the most famous is the *De Coronâ*. And of the *De Coronâ*, again, the most celebrated passage is that which is known as "The Oath." This particular passage, therefore, may justly be regarded as one of the highest and most memorable sayings ever spoken by man to men. The beauty and the power of it have been lavishly praised by the critics both of ancient and modern times.

Such passages are worthy of careful consideration and study. They belong to "the best that has been thought and said in the world," upon the necessity of knowing which, as a means of culture, Mr. Matthew Arnold is continually insisting. Few, we suppose, would disagree with Mr. Arnold on this point. It is not so much by extensive and indiscriminate reading, as by the earnest and long-continued contemplation of a few great models, that intellectual character is best developed. It is to the masterpieces, both ancient and modern, that seekers after culture must

resort. And he who goes in quest of these master-pieces will find that, as in art, so likewise in literature, many of them are Greek. It will be long before the world shall have ceased to go to school to Greece; before men can be persuaded to desist from the study of that language which, as some one has said, may be called a "dead language" only because it has "put off flesh and blood and put on immortality." The place, power and persistence of the Greek language and literature depend chiefly upon the fact that to them belongs so large a portion of "the best that has been thought and said in the world." No noisy newspaper debate as to the "utility" of the study of the dead languages can do away with the pursuit of them. That can be done only by superseding them and rendering them obsolete, through the showing of "a more excellent way," and the bringing in of a glory that excels their glory. That day, however, has evidently not yet dawned; in all probability it is still a good way off. For the present the precept of Horace,

Vos exemplaria Græca
Nocturna versate manu, versate diurna,

is almost as applicable in our day as it was in his.

We propose to consider the passage we have cited above, for the purpose of ascertaining, if possible, in some measure, what the qualities are to which it is indebted for its lasting fame. Every object that is eminently beautiful or great, every "everlasting possession," is what it is by virtue of certain principles imbedded in it, which may be supposed to be discoverable by a reverent and sympathetic contemplation. And these principles, when once ascertained, will be found to be of a general character, far-reaching, capable of manifold application. Not for the purpose of exercising an idle and superfluous admiration, but in the hope of finding useful instruction, do we address ourselves to the consideration of this great master-piece of Greek eloquence. We would reverently ask of it the secret of its greatness. We would put to it the question that was put to Samson, "Tell me, I pray thee, wherein thy great strength

lieth." What is it that makes it the most powerful passage in the greatest oration ever delivered by uninspired man? To what does it owe its strange power of moving the hearts of men even after the lapse of more than two thousand years? What principles are embodied in it, and have imparted to its prodigious "staying power"? And what has it to say to us as to the elements that must enter into the composition of whatever is great and enduring, and, more particularly, as to the means of reaching and moving the minds and hearts of men?

It is to be observed, as regards principles and rules, that it is only by this indirect method that they are at all arrived at. They are derived from certain existing models and master-pieces, which embody them, but were not produced by them. They have a value of their own, but they are not prior and producing; they are secondary and produced. The concrete and practical is always first; theory follows in its wake. It is not by observing certain rules that men are enabled to produce great works; but, first, great men produce great works, not by rule, but by a certain "divine instinct," and then, afterwards, it is observed that these works are in accordance with certain principles which it is very useful to know and treasure up.* The painting of the great painters and the eloquence of the great orators is the fruit of genius, and not the result of following certain prescriptions; of these prescriptions, on the contrary, they are themselves the fountain. The "rhetorica docens" is useful and necessary; but it is the child, and not the parent, of the "rhetorica utens."

* This is clearly stated by Cicero: "Ego hanc vim intelligo in præceptis omnibus, non ut ea secuti oratores eloquentiæ laudem sint adepti, sed quæ sua sponte homines eloquentes facerent, ea quosdam observasse, atque id egisse; sic esse non eloquentiam ex artificio, sed artificium ex eloquentia natum."

Equally pertinent is the following from Ullman, *Sündlosigkeit Jesu*, p. 175: "Wie auf dem Kunstgebiete die wirklich fortschreitende Entwicklung nicht so vor sich geht, dasz man zuerst eine Theorie aussinnt und nach dieser ein Werk hervorbringt, sondern höher begabte Genien mit besonnener Begeisterung mustermässige Werke ins Leben hinein stellen,

"The Oath" occurs in that part of the *De Corona* in which Demosthenes, having discussed the part which Æschines had played in provoking the Amphiſsian War, proceeds to speak (§§ 160–247) of his own part in defending his country against the consequences of that war by negotiating the alliance with Thebes. It is the natural culmination of a passage in which the progress of ideas is as follows: 1. At this critical juncture, Demosthenes had done all that a statesman could possibly, in the circumstances, have done; 2. In case any other line of policy had been pursued, the results would have been worse; 3. Even if all the results had been foreseen, there was nothing else the commonwealth could have done, that would have been worthy of herself and her ancestral principles. Such is the general course of the orator's argument; it is necessary, however, to follow it for a few moments somewhat more particularly.

Let us begin with that scene, the description of which has been so greatly admired,* the consternation at Athens when the news was received of the taking of Elatea by Philip. On that occasion, when the people had assembled and the crier put the question, "Who wishes to speak?" no one came forward. "The crier put the question repeatedly,—still no man rose, though all the generals were present and all the orators, and our country with her common voice called for some one to speak and save her. . . . That occasion, that day, as it seems,

und darmach sich dann auch das Urtheil über das wahrhaft Schöne und Grosse bestimmt und feststellt; so," u. s. w.

Take also the following from Ruskin: "I said just now that there was no exception to *this* law, that the great men never knew how or why they did things. . . . A good composition cannot be *contrary* to the rules. It may be contrary to certain principles supposed in ignorance to be general; but every great composition is in perfect harmony with all true rules, and involves thousands too delicate for ear, or eye, or thought to trace. Still it is possible to reason with infinite pleasure and profit about these principles, when the thing is once done; only all our reasonings will not enable us to do another thing like it, because all reason falls infinitely short of the divine instinct."

* See § 169: 'Εστέρα μὲν γὰρ ἦν, etc.

called not only for a patriot and a wealthy man, but for one who had closely followed the proceedings from their commencement, and rightly calculated for what object and purpose Philip carried them on. . . . Well then—I was the man called for on that day. I came forward and addressed you.”* He reports the substance of what he said on that occasion. The drift is as follows: It is a mistake to suppose that Philip has the Thebans on his side; had that been so, he would have been heard of, not at Elatea, but on the Athenian frontiers. It is no time to remember any unkindness received in time past from the Thebans; that would be just what Philip would desire. What do I advise? First, away with your present fear; rather fear for the Thebans,—they are nearer danger than we. Next, march to Eleusis, all fighting men and cavalry, that your friends in Thebes may have courage to speak out. Further, elect ten ambassadors to go to Thebes. Let them ask nothing of the Thebans (it would be dishonorable to do so at such a time) but offer to assist them, on the plea that they are in extreme danger, and we see the future better than they do. “This and more to the like effect I spoke, and left the platform. It was approved by all; not a word was said against me. Nor did I make the speech without moving, nor make the motion without undertaking the embassy, nor undertake the embassy without prevailing on the Thebans.”†

The accomplishment of this alliance with Thebes was the very measure that the crisis called for, and caused the danger which then encompassed the commonwealth “to pass away like a cloud.” If any one had a better plan, it was his duty, like a statesman, to disclose it then, not, like a pettifogger, to find fault when all was over. Nay, he will go further and say that, if any one can *now* point out a better course than that which

* In quoting from the oration, as also in giving the drift of the argument, we adopt the language of the excellent translation of Kennedy.

† This (§ 179) is the famous climax, so difficult to render exactly into English: οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ, οὐδ’ ἔγραψα μὲν, οὐκ ἐπείσβεσσα δέ, οὐδ’ ἐπείσβεσσα μὲν, οὐκ ἔπεισα δὲ Θηβαίους.

he pursued, he will confess that he was wrong,—that this ought not to have escaped him. But there is none. “Mark the line of my policy at that crisis; don’t rail at the event. The end of all things is what the Deity pleases; his line of policy it is that shows the judgment of the statesman. Do not then impute it to me as a crime that Philip chanced to conquer in battle; that issue depended not on me, but on God. Prove that I adopted not all measures that according to human calculation were feasible—that I did not honestly and diligently and with exertions beyond my strength carry them out—or that my enterprises were not honorable and worthy of the state and necessary. Show me this and accuse me as soon as you like.”

Having thus shown the wise and statesmanlike character of his measures, he proceeds to show that, in any other case, the result would have been worse. If they had fared thus with the Thebans as their allies, how would they have fared without them? If, when the battle was fought three days’ march from Attica, such peril and alarm surrounded the city, what might they not have expected if the same disaster had happened in some part of their own territory?

But, since Æschines insists so strongly on the *event*, he will venture to assert something of a paradox. “If the results had been foreknown to all, if all had foreseen them, and you, Æschines, had foretold them and protested with clamor and outcry—you that never opened your mouth—not even then should the Commonwealth have abandoned her design, if she had any regard for glory, or ancestry, or futurity.” Who would not have despised them if they had resigned without a struggle what their ancestors had encountered every danger to win? How could they have beheld strangers visiting their city, if the result had been what it was, and Philip had been chosen leader and lord of all, and others without them had made the struggle to prevent it? Their country had never preferred an ignominious security to the battle for honor. Who did not know that the Lacedæmonians, when they were in power, or the Thebans after them, or the Persian king, would gladly

have given her permission to take what she pleased and hold her own, provided she would accept foreign law and let another power command in Greece? But such conduct, to the Athenians of that day, would not have been national or natural, or endurable. No one could ever persuade the commonwealth to attach herself in secure subjection to the powerful and the unjust. Through every age it had been characteristic of her to persevere in a perilous struggle for precedency and honor and glory.

It is in the midst of this high strain of argument, and as the culmination of it, that the orator exclaims :

"But never, never can you have done wrong, O Athenians, in undertaking the battle for the freedom and safety of all! I swear it by your forefathers—those that met the peril at Marathon, those that took the field at Plataea, those in the sea-fight at Salamis, and those at Artemisium, and many other brave men who repose in the public monuments, all of whom alike, as being worthy of the same honor, the country buried, Æschines, not only the successful or victorious! Justly! For the duty of brave men has been done by all: their fortune has been such as the Deity assigned to each."

This is the Demosthenic Oath. We are on high ground. It is well to tarry here for a while and look around.

Such a burst of eloquence quickly comes and quickly goes. It is like a flash; its work is done in a moment. It will not do to seek to prolong the impression. Nothing is more transitory than extreme emotion. Hence it is perfectly natural, as well as in the highest degree artistic, when we find Demosthenes, almost immediately afterwards, resuming the narrative tone and recurring to such business-like matters as "decrees and transactions." Treating the passage as if it had been merely a parenthesis or a digression, he says: "But, in touching upon the deeds of your ancestors, there were some decrees and transactions which I omitted. I will return from my digression."

This parenthetic and apparently casual character of the passage has often been remarked. Not that it is in any sense isolated or abrupt; for, as we have seen, it comes with a noble

naturalness, as the natural culmination of a noble strain of argument. But, though coming naturally, it comes, in a measure, unexpectedly. And, moreover, it is so perfectly spontaneous, so entirely devoid of every appearance of effort or straining, that it produces the impression of being unstudied and unintended, of being "thrown in," so to speak, in passing. "This immortal Oath, more honorable to Demosthenes, according to Cardinal Duperron, than if the orator had raised from the dead the warriors whose memory he invokes, is not an eloquent climax, placed at the close of the oration, like Æschines' *protopœia*. It is a digression, a kind of unpremeditated parenthesis, spontaneously bursting from the orator's soul. Cicero or Mirabeau would undoubtedly have preserved it for the peroration; Demosthenes, the accomplished artist, did not."*

We mention this indirectness and perfect spontaneousness as the first in order of the characteristics we shall enumerate of this master-piece of eloquence. It is momentary; parenthesis-like; absolutely without effort; coming upon us with a perfect naturalness, and yet with a swift surprise. That it is of this character is unquestionably an important, though a subordinate, source of its strength. It captivates us and carries us away the more readily just because it bears no appearance of effort or design to do so. Its work is the more effectually done, just because it comes like a flash, and discharges in an instant, and with the ease of enormous strength, the accumulated force of the preceding argument.

We question whether examination would not reveal this spontaneousness and ease to be a characteristic quality of whatever is highest and greatest. There is some truth in Ruskin's saying, that "no great thing is ever done with effort, for a great thing is not done except by a great man, who does it without effort." There is truth also in what Schiller says:

"Since creation began,
All that mortals have wrought,
All that's godlike in man,
Comes—the flash of a thought!"

* Brédif's *Demosthenes*, p. 245.

Let us discriminate. We are not saying that great utterances are unconnected with toil. Labor and accomplishment are indissolubly joined together. We are only saying that, in the high moment itself of great utterance or achievement, effort has disappeared in the background. The labor belongs to the preparation for the act, not to the act itself. When long-continued discipline has done its work for a great soul, then, as the reward of having submitted to it, comes the power of saying or doing great things, in a moment, and without effort. The preparation for the work is long and toilsome; the work itself is short and swift, and bears the mark of a momentary emancipation from the servitude of toil. Inspiration comes only to the men of toil and endeavor. Every one knows by what severity of drill Demosthenes trained himself to be an orator. And, when we praise the indirectness, ease and spontaneity of the master's master-stroke, we are praising the patient toil which enabled him to achieve it.* Nevertheless, inspiration is a reality. The greatest things are said and done, in a certain sense, impromptu and parenthetically. They all bear the mark of what Schiller, in the poem from which we have quoted, calls *Die Gunst des Augenblicks*.†

* "It is said that armies can be disciplined to such a point that the soldier will find the battle-field a relaxation from the hardships and restraints of the drill-ground; and the orator who, when taken unawares, retorts upon his assailant with a shower of sentences so apt that they might each have been coined for the purpose of the moment, has purchased his enviable gift by many an hour of unseen and apparently objectless labor, which few among his audience, even with such a prize in prospect, could prevail upon themselves to undertake." Trevelyan's *Early History of Charles James Fox*, p. 57.

† There is a remarkable expression in one of Niebuhr's letters to his sister-in-law, Madame Hensler. Writing of his History, he says: "The most important points are the result of sudden flashes of light and divinations, with regard to which it often seriously crossed my mind, whether I had not been inspired by the spirits of the ancients, as a reward of my faithful efforts on behalf of their memory. But this I would on no account say to any one but yourself; besides, I do not say it in earnest now." *Life and Letters of Niebuhr*, p. 517 (Letter cccxv.)

Another characteristic quality of the passage we are considering is what we may term its *moderation* or *reserve*. It bears the marks of restraint. It is understating rather than overstating. Though passionate, it is not violent. The passion of it, though seemingly on the point of bursting through all barriers, is kept within bounds by a strong, overmastering and subduing hand. This moderation is characteristic of the passage as a whole; it comes to view, especially, at one particular point. "Mark," says Lord Brougham, "the severe simplicity, the subdued tone of diction, in the most touching parts of the '*old man eloquent's*' loftiest passages. In the Oath, when he comes to the burial-place where they repose by whom he is swearing, if ever a grand epithet were allowable, it is here; yet the only one he applies is *ἀγαθός*."

This quality of reserve is evidently one among the sources of the greatness and continuing power of this great piece of eloquence. It is what it is, partly because the power of reserve is in it. And it is safe to say that this great and far-reaching principle will be found imbedded, in one or another of its many forms, in the constitution of every act, or utterance, or character, in which there is extraordinary worth, strength or beauty. Truly has Goethe said:

"Vergebens werden ungebundne Geister
Nach der Vollendung reiner Höhe streben;
In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister,
Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben."

Limitation is one of the marks of mastership. To be "ungebunden" is weakness, violence, futility; strength, and power, and perfection go hand in hand with restraint. Lessing has shown that this principle of reserve is one of the sources of the excellence and enduring power of a well-known work of ancient sculpture.* It would be interesting to trace the workings of the same principle in the various departments of the great realm of Expression, and to show that it is present wherever the highest and greatest is present, in architecture, in painting

*Lessing's *Laokoön*, pp. 31, 32.

and sculpture, in poetry and eloquence, in music, in character and action. We content ourselves, for the present, with remarking the fact that whoever describes the eloquence of a great orator is obliged to mention this quality of reserve as a special characteristic of it. Justin McCarthy says of the eloquence of John Bright: "It never allowed itself to be mastered by passion. The first peculiarity that struck the listener was its superb self-restraint. The orator at his most powerful passages appeared as if he were keeping in his strength rather than taxing it with effort." The biographer of Rev. F. W. Robertson, whom Dean Stanley calls "beyond question the greatest preacher of the nineteenth century," says of him that "he did not use much action, but there was a restrained passion in him which forced people to listen." One who was himself a celebrated preacher said of the preaching of the eloquent Dr. Norman MacLeod: "His style reminds me of the smooth action of a large engine, moving with the ease of a great power held in restraint." Of our own greatest orator a famous American scholar writes: "It was a maxim of Webster's that violence of language was indicative of feebleness of thought and want of reasoning power, and it was his practice rather to understate than overstate the strength of his confidence in the soundness of his arguments and the logical necessity of his conclusions." The Hon. James G. Blaine, in his Memorial Oration, said of President Garfield: "The apparently reserved force which Garfield possessed was one of his great characteristics. He never did so well but it seemed he could easily have done better. He never expended so much strength but he seemed to be holding additional power at call." Let this suffice. All the masters, and all the master-pieces, unite in teaching the lesson taught by the Oath of Demosthenes, that reserve is one of the secrets of power.

The qualities we have named, though worthy of consideration, are yet of a somewhat minor and incidental character. We are coming nearer to the source of the strength of our passage when we say that it is a noble instance of the *alliance of logic*

and passion. Every great, influential and enduring utterance of man to men will be found to bear the mark of the alliance of these two great powers, of Head and Heart, of Intellect and Will, of Intelligence and Emotion. Great is Logic; it is the bearer of the torch, the finder of the path. Great, too, (nay, even more central and mighty in the constitution of man's being) is Passion; it is the moving and vitalizing power, that follows the path when found, or rough-hews a way where the intellect cannot find one. "Nothing great," says Hegel, "is accomplished without passion."* These two forces are often separated one from the other; and to this unnatural divorce may be traced a large proportion of the errors and mischief by which the world has been afflicted. Logic without passion is clear and cold; destitute of vitalizing and propelling power; standing "in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction." Nay, path-finder though it be, the intellect is prone even to miss the way when it goes in quest of the truth, alone and without the co-operation of the deeper, moral powers of man's nature. On the other hand, passion, without logic, is blind, brutal, fanatical, destructive. But if the two combine, concur and coalesce, the one loses its frigidity, and the other its fanaticism; the one gains intelligence and the other force; and against these allied powers nothing can stand. It is a high wedlock when logic and passion wed. And if it be in some rare, great soul, on some memorable occasion, and in behalf of some noble cause, the after ages shall most probably hear of whatever is then said or done.

Now, this is just what has taken place in the Oath. The alliance of which we speak is characteristic, indeed, of the eloquence of Demosthenes as a whole; and many particular passages might be cited from his orations as instances of it. But it appears nowhere else so strikingly as in the passage we are considering. Look at this Oath; it is fiery passion, burning and flaming with the noblest emotions. Look again; and it is logic, clear, collected, never for a moment losing its head.

* "Nichts Groszes geschieht ohne Leidenschaft."

It is both : it is logic inflamed with passion, and it is passion, steadied and regulated by logic. Consider what argument Demosthenes is making at this particular point. He is showing that the failure of a measure is no proof of its unsoundness ; he is arguing that, notwithstanding its unsuccessful issue, his policy was the only one that was worthy of the commonwealth and her ancestral principles. Then comes the passionate apostrophe to those who fought at Marathon and Platæa ; an outburst by which a weaker man would have found himself swept off his feet, and his hold upon his argument lost. Not so Demosthenes ; his grasp upon his argument is not for an instant relaxed. We find it recurring, distinct and clear, at the close of the apostrophe itself, where, having spoken of the " brave men who repose in the public monuments," he adds : "*all of whom alike*, as being worthy of the same honor, the country buried, Æschines, not only the successful or victorious !" There is something unique and impressive in this coolness in the midst of the inflammation ; in this combination of sober and steady argument with tumultuous and intoxicating passion. An American business man would call it " level-headed." We do not like the term, but we know of no other which so correctly and picturesquely describes the way in which Demosthenes comes in, holding his argument aloft and unshaken, at the close of this passionate and perilous strain.

We point to this principle of the alliance of logic and passion, as one of the reasons why the Oath is a masterpiece of human eloquence. We had thought, proceeding from this as a starting-point, to follow the same principle into other regions ; to show how great and far-reaching it is, and that it is operative everywhere in the world of thought and of action, and that, in particular, it is present as one of the secret sources of strength and duration wherever the highest and greatest is present. Our limits forbid our undertaking to do this. We rest content, therefore, with showing that the principle is imbedded in the particular masterpiece we have been studying ; adding only, in general terms, that, in our judgment, this coalition of logic

and passion is a characteristic which every "everlasting possession" will be found upon examination to bear. If aught has been discovered of the highest truth; if any man, dead generations ago, is wielding kingly power over his fellow-men now; if any great word has been spoken, which the hearts of men in after ages have leaped up to hear and make response to; if any vast, beneficent and enduring work has been wrought by man for the benefit of mankind; be sure that intellectual and moral forces, head and heart, intelligence and passion, have combined for the discovery of that truth, for the formation of that man's character, for the utterance of that word, for the accomplishment of that work. Not by Heart alone; still more, not by Head alone; but by Heart and Head combined, are all the great things thought, and said, and done.

We proceed with our examination. We have hitherto been considering our passage almost more as a masterpiece in general than as an orator's masterpiece. We come to speak of it more narrowly, now, as the most perfect example of human eloquence, and to inquire into the sources of its excellence and power as an orator's utterance to his audience. What is it that gives to the Oath, as to all eloquence of the highest order, its peculiar thrilling and electrifying power? In endeavoring to reply to this question, we are obliged to speak once more of a concurrence of forces. The supreme moments of eloquence are caused and characterized by the concurrence of two powers, —the power of the orator and the power of the audience.

Let us explain. The effect of an orator's utterance depends upon his being, in a certain deep sense, one with those whom he addresses. It is not in what he says, separately and independently taken, but in what he gives voice to. He must be, as we say, *en rapport* with his audience. The vibrating and electrifying power of the noblest eloquence comes from the chord which it strikes, and the deep response which it awakens, in the souls of the hearers. When any memorable and immortal word is spoken to men, it is, to use an expression of Carlyle's, "as if the Silences had at length found utterance"

in it. And those are the supreme moments of oratory, when, on some high occasion, and on some lofty theme, the orator becomes, as it were, the mouth-piece of those to whom he speaks.

Of this great principle Demosthenes makes distinct mention more than once. We refer, in particular, to the *De Coronâ*, § 277, where he says that "the speaker's power depends for the most part on the hearers;"* and to the Oration on the Embassy, § 392, where the same sentiment is negatively expressed; "Other powers are tolerably independent, but that of speaking is reduced to nothing when you who hear are opposed."†

Not only does he clearly state the principle, but he is all the time acting upon it; it underlies all his orations, particularly the *De Coronâ*, with which we are more immediately concerned. In this oration he constantly identifies himself with his hearers and his hearers with himself. At certain critical points he takes pains, he goes out of his way, to show and to maintain that this identity exists. This is particularly the case in § 206, where, having spoken of the ancestral spirit and sentiments of the commonwealth as having necessitated the measures he had proposed, he adds: 'Had I attempted to say, that I instructed you in sentiments worthy of your ancestors, there is not a man who would not justly rebuke me. What I declare is, that such principles are your own; I show that before my time such was the spirit of the commonwealth; though certainly in the execution of the particular measures, I claim a share also for myself.' Take another passage:‡ "I should conclude, Æschines, that you undertook this cause to exhibit your eloquence and strength of lungs, not to obtain satisfaction for any wrong. But it is not the language of an orator, Æschines, that has any value, nor yet the tone of his voice, but his adopting the same views with the people, and his hating and loving

* Καίτοι ἔγωγ' ὅρῳ τῆς τῶν λεγόντων δυνάμεως τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοὺς πλείστον κυρίως.

† Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι δυνάμεις ἐπιεικῶς εἰσιν αὐτάρκεις, ἣ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν, ἂν τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν τῶν ἀκουούων ἀντιστῇ, διακόπτεται.

‡ §§ 280, 281.

the same persons that his country does.* He that is thus minded will say everything with loyal intention: he that courts persons from whom the commonwealth apprehends danger to herself, rides not on the same anchorage with the people (*οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμῇ τοῖς πολλοῖς*) and therefore has not the same expectation of safety. But,—do you see?—I have; for my objects are the same with those of my countrymen; I have no interest separate or distinct." Again (§§ 292, 293): "A person who pretends, as he did, to care for the laws and constitution, ought at least to have this about him, that he grieves and rejoices for the same cause as the people†, and not by his politics to be enlisted in the ranks of the enemy, as Æschines has plainly done, saying that I am the cause of all, and that the commonwealth has fallen into trouble through me, when it was not owing to my views or principles that you began to assist the Greeks; for, if you conceded this to me, that my influence caused you to resist the subjugation of Greece, it would be a higher honor than any that you have bestowed upon others. I myself would not make such an assertion,—it would be doing you injustice,—nor would you allow it, I am sure; and Æschines, if he acted honestly, would never, out of enmity to me, have disparaged and defamed the greatest of your glories." Notice with what wise instinct, as well as consummate art, he repudiates the thought that the views and principles in question were his own in distinction from those of the people, and insists that they were the views and principles of the people themselves. Well he understood that any such isolation from his hearers would be fatal to his influence and power as an orator.

Such is the principle, as stated, acknowledged, and continually acted upon by the great Athenian orator. But it may be asked, How are we to reconcile this principle of the necessity of an orator's being identified with his hearers and having the same views and feelings with them, with the fact that it is his

* ἀλλὰ τὸ ταῦτα προαίρεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς μισεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ὅσπερ ἂν ἡ πατρίς.

† ταῦτα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ταῦτα χαίρειν τοῖς πολλοῖς.

duty to convince them and *bring them over* to the view he is expounding and urging? Surely, an orator is not simply one who says what his hearers already think, know and feel. He is no mouthpiece in that sense. The orator stands aloof. It is his office to argue, to prove, to persuade, to carry his point. It is characteristic of him that he "lays his mind" on other men, and compels them "to believe as he believes."

There is no contradiction here. The orator is both identified with, and separated from, his hearers. But the oneness is deeper than the isolation. The one is of the depths; the other is of the surface. It is a correct statement of the relation between orator and audience to say, that there exists between them a general and fundamental oneness, as a basis for the reconciliation and removal of a particular and superficial difference. He is one with them (to borrow a phrase from Theremin) in the realm of "universal and necessary Ideas," that he may make them one with him in the realm of the "particular Idea." The principle we are stating is indeed substantially the same with that which is laid down by the writer whom we have just cited, when he says: "The highest law of Eloquence, therefore, is this: the particular Idea which the orator wishes to realize, is to be carried back to the necessary Ideas of the hearer."* It is in obedience to this law that Demosthenes, in endeavoring to carry his point as regards the particular view he is urging, constantly aims to show that it is involved as a necessity in the views and principles held in common by his hearers and himself. To this community of belief he makes his confident appeal. He will allow no one to say that it is his own belief and not the people's; he insists, and proves, that such has always been the spirit of the commonwealth. He takes pains to reiterate, at intervals, the affirmation that the high ground on which he stands is the ground on which the Athenian people stand, and always have stood, with him.† It is

* Theremin's *Rhetoric*, p. 73.

† As a significant comment on this striking peculiarity of the Greek orator, we subjoin the following profoundly truthful words of Theremin: "That

thus he plants himself on his oneness with his hearers as a vantage-ground for the overcoming of their difference from him.

Such, ordinarily, is the relation of the orator to his audience; a relation of general identification for the removal of a particular disagreement. Now, what we wish to say, is, that, in eloquence of the highest order, there are moments when the disagreement entirely vanishes; when, not unprepared for, but precipitated at last by the striking of some hidden chord, by the mention of some magic name, a complete coalescence of orator and audience takes place. It is a high and memorable moment when this occurs. It is, for the time being, as if the struggle were over, and the victory were being celebrated with shout and song. The eloquence that is born of such a coalescence is known by its peculiar reverberating and thrilling quality. And the reason is, that it is then no longer simply the orator who is speaking, but his hearers who are finding voice through him. He has become, in a noble sense, their mouth-piece; and that which is highest and noblest in them is uttering itself through him with a voice like "the voice of many waters." Such moments are rare, and swift of passage; but, if the occasion be great, and the orator be worthy of it, that which they leave behind them has the ring of immortality in it.

It was at such a moment that the Oath was born. The lofty strain of eloquence preceding it had prepared the way; the mention of Marathon fused orator and audience into one; and, lo, the echoing and re-echoing of the words then spoken continue to this day. We venture to say that the most electrifying utterances, the eloquence that has in it most of the "long-resounding march and energy divine," will be found to

these Ideas (Duty, Virtue, &c.) are leading Ideas in each and every hearer, the orator presupposes; but even if he is mistaken, even if no one of them, in any of the above specified forms, exists in the hearers—a thing which we affirm to be impossible—still this confident presupposition would be the best means by which to generate them; for in proportion as men are assumed to be better than they are, and are so treated, do they become better than they are." *Rhetoric*, p. 110.

bear the mark of having been produced by such a concurrence. And, conversely, whenever, on any high occasion, such a concurrence has taken place, the words then spoken are likely to have in them somewhat of this thrilling quality. We might cite many instances. Turning away, however, from the great orations, we choose, as an instance perfectly well suited to illustrate our point, the words spoken by President Lincoln at the dedication of the National Cemetery at Gettysburg; words entirely unassuming, and making no claim to be an oration at all, but which, just because of their having in them something of this principle, thrilled the hearts of men, and do still thrill them, and are likely to go down to posterity. It is natural to find the classical Everett, in the polished oration which he delivered on that memorable occasion, making mention of Marathon, which indeed there was much in the place and in the time to suggest. But it is remarkable that it was President Lincoln who, without naming any Greek battle-field or any Greek orator, spoke words very much akin, in some respects, to the words of Demosthenes, when he swore by those who fought at Marathon. Consider this brief speech. Modest as the words are, they bear some of the infallible marks of a great utterance. They are strong in their severe simplicity, their subdued tone, their compressed passion. But their chief strength, and their principal resemblance to the passage we are considering, lies in this, that there is in them something of that concurrence of which we have been speaking. He who, throughout the dark days of the nation's struggle for life, stood, as did no other man, with the people and for the people, was especially one with them at the moment when he spoke these words; and it was the deepest thoughts and feelings of thousands of his countrymen that found utterance in his voice, when, standing at that hour of gloom and peril on one of the great battle-fields of the war, he gave utterance to the sublime oath (for this too was an oath) that "the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, should not perish from the face of the earth." It will be long before the last echo of those

words shall have died away; and just for the reason we have given.

It is no one's duty to be a great orator. But it is the lot of many to be called upon to speak to their fellow-men upon important subjects. To all such the principle we have been endeavoring to lay open is one of practical importance. He who would influence the people for their good, must "ride on the same anchorage" with the people. His power over them depends upon his being *en rapport* with them. He must maintain, fortify and defend his oneness with them, that he may overcome their disagreement with him. He must make his appeal to the deep things of the human soul. And he may confidently rely upon the existence, in the souls of the men to whom he speaks, of mighty and beneficent powers, which will rise up, in recognition and response, if once the right word be spoken.

If the right word be spoken, we say. And this brings us to our last point. For what sort of word is it that shall reach, and stir, and thrill the hearts of men, and rouse their slumbering energies into action? Carlyle writes in his Journal: "In all times there is a word which, spoken to men, to the actual generation of men, would thrill their inmost soul. But the way to find that word? The way to speak it when found? *Opus est consulto.*"* Carlyle's own quest after this secret was not without its measure of success, as is shown by the effect of the words spoken by him to his fellow-men. We, too, may learn something of the mystery. Every great word that has been said, and not least the memorable word we are now considering, has something to teach us concerning it.

The chief source of the moving and thrilling power of the Demosthenic Oath lies in this, that there is in it "the sound of a great soul." Its principal characteristic mark is that of a certain personal, present, passionate nobleness. We cannot separate the orator and his words. The orator's soul is in his words. The Oath is the voice of that which is highest in a

* Froude's *Life of Carlyle*, Vol. ii, Ch. xv.

rare and noble soul, appealing to that which is highest in the souls of those to whom it is addressed. It is ever thus, that the word which is to move men and carry them away captive, must be spoken, not to that which is petty and poor and selfish in them, but to that which is large and unselfish and noble; and that this word can be spoken only by one who is himself of great and noble soul.

Demosthenes, in the Oath, is but doing, in the highest degree, what he is elsewhere and always doing, in this and his other orations. A certain uniform high-mindedness is one of the distinguishing qualities of his eloquence. His strength lies chiefly in his high moral tone. He always appeals to that which is lofty, and never to that which is low. He never speaks merely to please his audience. No orator ever was more careful to conciliate his hearers and to preserve his oneness with them; none ever more sternly refused to tell them aught but the truth. No statesman ever was more bent upon the discovery of practicable and expedient measures: none ever more loftily disdained to govern his conduct by expediency, rather than by principle. He is simple, sincere, straightforward and honest; despising all artifices, evasions, shifts, tricks and hypocrisies; going straight to the heart of the matter; planting himself upon reality. Truth, principle, equity, honor, are great words with him. There are certain points which are ever recurring in his orations; certain general truths, of which he never permits the Athenians to hear the last. They are such as these: That equity is the only solid foundation for men to build on; That life is worthless if it may not be had with freedom and honor; That he who depends on others will never get on; That it never will go well with the Athenians till they leave off their speculating habits, and apply themselves to doing the things they ought to do; That Athens has always striven for glory, and not for gain; That it has been characteristic of the commonwealth to care more for the freedom and safety of the Greeks in general than for her own separate advantage.

If space were at our command, we could quote many passages from the Philippics and Olynthiacs, as also from the *De Coronâ*, to show that this loftiness of spirit is one of the principal distinguishing marks of Demosthenes as an orator. We refer to the extracts already given in the introduction to this article. Take also, the following, from the Third Olynthiac: "For it is not, O men of Athens, it is not in nature that stability should be given to power by oppression, and falsehood, and perjury. Dominion may for once be thus obtained; it may even endure for a season; and, by the favor of fortune, may present to men's hopes a flourishing aspect; but time will search it, and of itself it must crumble in pieces. For, as the lower part of buildings, and vessels, and all such structures, should be the most solid, so should the motives and principles of our actions be founded in justice and truth."* It is to the same effect, when in the *De Coronâ*, he exclaims: "Only see, how rotten in its nature (and justly so) is every wicked contrivance!" † In the same oration he asks: "What greater crime can an orator be charged with, than that his opinions and his language are not the same?" ‡ There is a passage § which Lord Brougham regards among the finest in all Demosthenes; and of which he praises the rapidity of the declamation, and the absolute perfection of the choice of words. Without doubt it is a most noble passage; but it is equally certain that it derives most of its force from its high moral tone, from the appeal which it makes to the high character of Athens, as having ever in the past striven for honor and renown, and expended blood and treasure for the general weal. It is this high appeal which infuses rapidity and energy and fire into the diction and style. Much more might we say in proof and illustration of our point. We only add,

* Olynth. III., §§ 9, 10.

† *De Coron.*, § 227: θεάσασθε τοίνυν ὡς σαθρόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ φύσει πᾶν ὄντι ἂν μὴ δικαίως ἢ πεπραγμένον.

‡ *De Coron.*, § 282: τὶ δὲ μείζον ἔχει τις ἂν ἀδίκημα κατ' ἀνδρὸς βήτορος ἢ εἰ μὴ ταῦτ' αὖ φρονεῖ καὶ λέγει.

§ *De Coron.*, §§ 66-72.

that whoever has studied the character of this orator will feel that his words are true when, toward the close of the oration for the Crown, he says: "Then do you ask me, Æschines, for what merit I claim to be honored? I will tell you. Because, while all the statesmen in Greece, beginning with yourself, have been corrupted, formerly by Philip and now by Alexander, me neither opportunity, nor fair speeches, nor large promises, nor hope, nor fear, nor anything else could tempt or induce to betray aught that I considered just and beneficial to my country. Whatever I have advised my fellow-citizens, I have never advised like you men, leaning as in a balance to the side of profit: all my proceedings have been those of a soul upright, honest, and incorrupt."*

Of the many superiorities of our orator, it is this moral nobleness, in our judgment, to which all the others are tributary. His chief strength, and the main reason of his enduring fame as an orator, lies in this, that he, being worthy to do so, worthy intellectually and worthy morally, spoke to that which was highest and noblest in the souls of those who heard him. The soul of man is naturally and constitutionally noble. He has never utterly forgotten "that imperial palace whence he came." It is evidence of this, that the words which move him most and wake the deepest echoes in his being are those which appeal, not to that in him which is petty and mercenary and mean, but to that which is lofty, unselfish, magnanimous. Undoubtedly, there is at all times a right word to be spoken; a word which, as Carlyle says, will thrill the inmost souls of men. But it is a word about high and difficult things. It is a word that speaks of righteousness, justice and truth; of responsibility, duty, fidelity, sacrifice. Moreover, it can be spoken only by the right man. There is no magic in it. Spoken by any other (could we conceive that possible) it would lose its power. And the right man is he who not only perceives, and is able to make others perceive, the things which are right, and good, and true, but whose soul is burning with the passionate love of these

* *De Coron.* §§ 297, 298.

things and the passionate desire to make them prevail among men. When such an one speaks the right word, a strange power goes along with the speaking of it. It goes "from soul to soul;" from that which is highest in the soul of the orator to that which is highest in the souls of his hearers. There is in its stern, high, uncompromising demands, a peculiar attractiveness that is not found in words more complaisant and accomodating. There is in it a vitality, and a vitalizing energy, which other words do not possess, and which is the characteristic token of its coming from that which is highest, and going to that which is highest, in the soul of man. And the hearts of men leap up to hear and make response, when they are thus spoken to. Whoever is able to speak this word, him his fellow-men call master; his voice they know and him they follow.

Whoever is able to speak it, we say. For the secret of the orator's power is one which, when discovered, is a secret still. In the last analysis, it is none other, indeed, than the secret of nobleness of character, of superiority of soul. The principle of eloquence is virtually that which is expressed by Lowell, in the lines:

" Be noble, and the nobleness which lies
In other men, sleeping though never dead,
Will rise in majesty to meet thine own."

We question whether the definition which Quintilian ascribes to the elder Cato has ever been improved upon, that "The orator is an upright man who understands speaking." Who shall teach us the art of being noble? Well might Carlyle say, *Opus est consulto*. Poor man is forever trying to accomplish by machinery what can be accomplished only by manhood. He is apt to seek in the realm of the external and the circumstantial for that which can be found only in the realm of spiritual life. He is prone to put his trust in rules, artifices and contrivances. It is a pitiable sight to see men endeavoring to achieve, by some trick of "elocution," results which can be achieved only by superior strength and nobility of soul. We are not dispara-

ging elocution; the example of Demosthenes himself shows that whoever would excel must master this, along with much else belonging to the art, by severe and painful toil. We are only saying that these things are auxiliary; and whoever seeks to find in them the citadel of the strength of Demosthenes or any other great orator, will seek in vain.

What we have now said bears directly upon the passage we are considering, and finds in it perfect support and illustration. It is, by universal agreement, the most perfect specimen of human eloquence. It is this, we do not hesitate to say, because it is an appeal, by one every way worthy to make it, to that which is noblest in men's souls. It is impossible to suppose that any appeal, addressed to feelings less pure and lofty, or coming from a man of ignoble character, could ever have found the immortality which these words have obtained.

Mark two things that are in this oath: First, the vehement and indignant denial that the failure of their policy was any proof of its having been wrong; the passionate assertion that, notwithstanding its ill success, the course they had pursued was, and forever would remain, the only right course for the Athenian people to have pursued. The reader will remember that this thought runs throughout that entire strain of "more than mortal eloquence" (as a distinguished critic has called it) which precedes, and finds its natural culmination in, the oath. The same recurs further on in the oration, where Demosthenes shows that, amid the many evils under which both Greeks and barbarians were laboring at the time of his speaking, Athens enjoyed a more tolerable lot than any other state, with this besides, that she had chosen the noblest policy (*προέλθειν τὰ χελλίστα*). It is in the oath, however, that the sentiment so to speak, discharges itself with all the force it had gathered as the argument proceeded.

Now, it was a deep and powerfully vibrating chord which Demosthenes struck when he appealed to the sense of the necessary and indefeasible correctness, at all times and under all circumstances, of magnanimous action; when he declared that

to have done nobly, to have acted worthily of their ancestors, to have followed the path of duty and honor, was, irrespective of all results, the right thing to have done. That to act nobly is best, whatever may follow; that courage is better than cowardice, generosity than selfishness, magnanimity than meanness; these are among the things high and true, to which, just because they are high and true, the soul responds with a loud yea and amen. Nor can we forbear noticing how the Greek orator's own life enforces the lesson of the lofty word he is speaking here. He failed in his plans; all his undertakings in behalf of his country's liberty came to naught. Nay, there are historians who even say that he ought to have failed; that, in resisting Philip, he was opposing the march of progress and civilization. What matters it all? His life was no mistake. In failing he succeeded. Nor can anything ever reverse the verdict by which posterity has decreed an everlasting renown to this man who failed.

There is a failure which is no failure. Success does not lie in the mere literal getting of the particular thing we aim to get, but consists rather in the noble striving after noble objects by force of an inward kinship with them, and a passionate desire for them. Of the workings of this deep and far-reaching principle, involved in the oath as one of the elements of its strength, we have not space to speak. We would only indicate the application of it to the noblest of all our enterprises, the quest after the truth. We have had much to say in this article concerning the concurrence of powers. It would seem indeed as if everything high and noble were the result of some such concurrence. This is true in particular of our apprehension and holding of the truth. The truth is held by us when we are *en rapport* with the inward life of it; when the power of the truth itself and the power of our own affinity and yearning for it flow together in one. Such a concurrence is essential to every completely successful apprehension of the truth. In this world, however, where so many things are disjointed that belong together, these two are often separated.

Sometimes the truth is present (or seems to be present) without meeting with that deep inward consonance and craving of soul upon which the true apprehension of it depends. The right doctrine is held by the mind but the heart's passionate love of the truth is not there. Such a finding of the truth, it is plain, is no real finding. Everything depends upon how and why we hold the truth. "There are men," says Dr. MacLeod, "who no more grasp the truth which they seem to hold than a sparrow grasps the message passing through the electric wire on which it perches." * "A man," says Milton, "may become a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only because his pastor says so, or the assembly so determines, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes his heresy." †

On the other hand, there is a missing of the truth that is no real missing. Where men have sought the truth with passionate yearning and lofty endeavor, and yet have fallen short of the right doctrine, who will say that this is exclusively mistake and failure? Is not this passionate impulse itself a constituent part of the apprehension of the truth by us, without which no such apprehension could really exist? Who does not feel that, with all their exaggeration, there is a certain element of truth in the words of Lessing, where he says: "If God held all truth shut in His right hand, and in His left hand nothing but the ever-restless instinct for truth, though with the condition of forever and ever erring, and should say to me 'Choose!' I should humbly bow to His left hand, and say, 'Father, give! Eternal Truth is for Thee alone!'" We are, no believers in the monstrous heresy that it matters not *what* a man believes, provided he believe it sincerely. But neither do we believe in the opposite heresy, that it matters not *how* a man holds the truth, provided only he hold the correct belief. And we believe that the surest way to the finding of the truth, to the hearing

* *Life of Dr. Norman MacLeod*, vol. ii. p. 34.

† Milton's *Areopagitica*; *Prose Works*, vol. ii. p. 84.

of His voice who is the Truth, is to be "*of the truth*" (John xviii. 37).

Finally, the other thing in this Oath to which we refer, in proof of our assertion that its strength lies in its being an appeal to that which is highest and noblest in the soul, is, the *spirit of sacrifice*. Nothing in the universe is more fundamental, or more pervading, than the Law of Sacrifice. It is one of the great mysteries of our life; who shall explain it? Especially does the spirit of sacrifice go hand in hand everywhere with excellence and perfection: The mark of the cross is the distinguishing mark of that which is highest. Is there anywhere a crown of excellence; look closely, and the cross of suffering will be found there along with it. Has any one approached more closely than others to the heights of pure Perfection; behold, the token of it is a "*visage marred*,"—he is "*a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief*," "*Wherever Genius is*," says Heine, "*there is Golgotha*." And most truly has Goethe sung:

"Wer nie sein Brod mit Thränen asz,
Wer nie die kummervollen Nächte
Auf seinem Bette weinend sas,
Der kennt Euch nicht, Ihr himmlischen Mächte!"

Has any act been performed, the memory of which mankind have refused to let perish; it was an act of heroic devotion, a deed done, not for self, but for others,—for country, for fellow-men. Has a word been spoken which penetrated and thrilled the inmost souls of men; it was most probably a word which appealed, with quickening power, to the often sleeping but never dying instinct for sacrifice. Always and everywhere, the cross is the principle of excellence, and strength, and power, and perpetuity. Not without meaning was the ancient legend that the spot in which the cross of Jesus Christ was planted was the actual centre of the universe.

No more resonant chord can be struck than that which is touched when the soul's high instinct for sacrifice is worthily appealed to. It would be safe to say, beforehand that the

world's most memorable piece of eloquence would of necessity have in it something of this lofty appeal. Such is the case. How could it have been otherwise? Listen to the voice of this Oath. There is in it no deeper tone than that which speaks of sacrifice. "Never, never can you have been mistaken, O Athenians, in undertaking the battle for the freedom and safety of all!" We do not mean that the spirit of which we speak is confined to these particular words. It is in the entire passage; * it is in the name of every battle, Marathon, Platæa, Salamis, Artemisium, in which Athenians fought for their country and for the freedom and safety of the Greeks in general.

We simply point this out; we cannot dwell upon it. We would only, in taking leave of our passage, call attention to the lesson which it teaches, that the spirit of sacrifice is the spirit of strength and immortality. In one of its thousand forms, the mark of the cross will be found upon all that is great and influential and enduring. When the first Christians fancied that they saw the sign of the cross everywhere—in the flying bird, in the sailing ship, in the human form with outstretched arms,—they fancied more truly than they knew. The cross is indeed everywhere. Its line is gone out through all the earth. There is no speech nor language where the voice of it is not heard. He whose hope is in the cross of Jesus Christ will rejoice in the testimonies which he finds, in the glorious and immortal works of the heathen world, to the depth and universality of the law which that cross stands for. And when, exploring the world's great masterpiece of eloquence, to ascertain wherein its strength consists, and what marks it is known by, he has penetrated to the centre and citadel of its power, he will start with a thrill of delight to find that its animating spirit is none other than the spirit of sacrifice, and that, chief among the many marks it bears, is the well-known mark of the cross.

* Its presence will be noted, in a way which cannot well be expressed in English, in the prefix *προ* in the participle *προκινδυνεύσαντας*.

V.

THE PERILS OF THE REPUBLIC.

BY THE REV. C. Z. WEISER, D. D.

FIFTY years ago, it was thought treasonable already, to even intimate that so much as a shadow of danger might loom up and over the fair escutcheon of our country. The American Republic was the *Ultima Thule* of political science and art. "Without spot or wrinkle, or any such thing," the popular structure was held as "a thing of beauty and a joy forever." Our national fabric stood amid the galaxy of tolerated but doomed realms, as the Main Building in the Park Centennial—the surrounding establishments were only annexes, or temporary circumstances at best.

The Constitution of the Union, it was supposed, embodied the crystallization of all the jurisprudence worth preserving, from the days of Lycurgus and Solon, and all other ancient lawgivers, together with the quintessence of the best modern statecraft, to boot.

Our Rulers were regarded as organs of Eternal Justice crying through the people: a *Vox-Populi-Vox-Dei* handiwork, in which the will of God could and did voice itself through the people. The Laws were held to be the loud utterances of an invisible but real Sinai, over the national desert. All Legislators stood for invulnerable characters, clad in an armor that was esteemed proof against partisanship, prejudice and passion. Every Jurist wore ermine, spotless as the newly-fallen snow, and emblematic of his stainless record. Candidates for the exalted stations in the realm, were sought out, brought out and forced out, to serve where they could do the most good to the greatest number.

American Citizenship stood far above the boasted height of Roman citizenship in the palmyest days of the Empire. The National Holidays were Festal seasons, when hills and dales, rural and urban localities were alive with martyr-spirits, and musical with patriotic airs. The orator at the hustings, the Fourth-of-July spokesman, the eloquent statesman—all struck one key, held one theory, and predicted a love of country—

“ Until the stars grow old,
And the Sun grow cold,
And the leaves of the Judgment-Book unfold.”

Down, as near as the burning *focus* of the late civil war, it was proverbial to call our Government the best under the sun. And whoever expressed doubt on that point, was in danger of being branded as a fanatic, or of being jostled off to some Federal Fort, the American Bastile.

Alas! That all things change. That roses wither! That pictures fade, and beauty dims! That a happy dream must vanish, when star and moon-light merge in sun-light!

To-day, we are told that the American Republic is but an experiment! Rather a bold and successful one, to be sure, but one no longer to be held as a consummated fact, assured and doubly safe against every emergency that may arise.

The Constitution of the political ‘fathers’ is indeed a fair, respectable, and very remarkable document, when read in the dim light of the age and circumstances, and men of its formation. But ‘Amendments’ must elongate and overlay it, until Rip Van Winkle like, the sires would scarcely know their own child. In the blaze of modern times, what could the ‘fathers’ know? They stand related to their precocious offspring, as the slow-coach to the engine; the post-man on horse-back, to the fast mail-train; the Packet-bugle, to the express car, the telegraph, or telephone; as the dame’s needle, to the sewing-machine; as the mud-roads, to the Grand Trunk thoroughfares; as the goose-quill, to the caligraph; as the prognostic ground-hog, to ‘Old Probability;’ as the lost Adam, to the theories of ‘Evolution, Protoplasm, and Agnosticism.’

Our Rulers are figure-heads, at most. Legislators are supposed to have no rights, which the pulpit, press, or public, are bound to respect. Candidates are a 'pestiferous set.' National holidays are like forsaken camping-grounds, dark and dead; boyish offdays. Citizenship has dwindled down to the privilege of manipulating the elective franchise. Loyalty and patriotism are fossil virtues; sometimes to be galvanized into a spasmodic energy, by the prospect of high office, prominent appointment, lucrative contract, bounty or bribe. Treason and Rebellion are only odious in women, prison-keepers, and deserting privates. For all leaders in the diversion, it is to be followed by a poetical hanging, a general absolution, and joyful hand-shaking, over a national debt of millions, a countless host of holocausts, and an army of maimed men, widowed mothers, and half-orphaned offspring, as numerous as the stars.—But why prolong the antitheses? The contrast presented between what was, and that which is now, seems sufficiently pronounced.

Wherefore, then, this marked change in the public conscience of the Nation? Why this fall in the popular barometer? In consequence of what has the decline of enthusiasm set in?

The proffered answers, from various quarters, are significant and instructive, in as much as they concede the fact, that such a falling off has occurred; that it is discerned generally, and that it is indicative of a serpent, which may transform the fair Republic into another Paradise Lost.

Without proving a radical, or an indifferentist, but possessing our soul in patience, we will pass under review the alleged dangers that threaten the Republic, in order that the peril which jeopardizes it most seriously may be also most emphasized and deprecated.

Good and wise citizens see our National peril in the violent Spirit of Party. "Partizanship," we are told, "is the bane of the Republic." And if Dr. Johnson's famous epigram:—"Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel"—is not to be endorsed, a charge of this nature ought to be heeded, and re-

spectfully considered. Did not George Washington already see and anticipate this source of danger?

If this be the canker-worm that is eating at the vitals of the Nation, surely the Republic may verily be said to have carried it in its loins, already from birth. The seed of dissolution had then been inlaid with its foundation. Can we recall a period of our country's history, when Parties were not? During the incipient stages of the struggle for Independence; through it; down to, and through the war of 1812; all through the Mexican war; through the late civil war; to this hour, Parties had been, are, and, likely, will remain on and on. It is a chronic ailment, indeed, if it be an ailment, at all.

It is, moreover to be noted, that no first-class Nation ever existed, in whose bosom Parties were not cherished. If the American Republic suffers from partizanship, to the death, then, all Nations either have, or are succumbing to this common malady. It must accordingly be regarded as a universal fatality, under which all Governments sink into oblivion.

It might be asked too, whether the system of party may not be written down as an art preservative, on the other hand? Can a better system of checks and balances be substituted, than this affords us? It is astonishing to remark, how quietly and finally the opposite beams rest on a placid level, after alternating rapidly and high, and without a Revolution. The famous ending of the Hayes and Tilden campaign will ever be singled out by the lover of Republican institutions, as a proof of the fact, that Party Spirit, however violent, need not always cost the Nation's head.

We may safely say, then, that a system that carries within itself helps and hindrances alike; that holds an antidote in one hand, for the bane in the other; that, at the worst, is but a "bitter-sweet;" such a self-correcting instrument will not be the deadly weapon to the Republic.

It has been said:—"Not Party Spirit, as such; not partizanship, fair, honorable, and legitimate; but "Bossism," its bastard form—that is digging the grave of the Nation!

It is verily to be lamented, that such a vulgar term should have been foisted into our political parlance. It savors more of the cow-pen, or the cattle market, than of popular domains. The Hon. Frederick Douglass can teach some of our leaders and legislators a better word. His term is, "Mastery." It is becoming, clean-cut, and classic. We shall always remember how expressive the utterance of this prince of orange-colored orators sounded to us, when he tersely said:—"We have abolished Slavery; and now we have to do with Mastery."

But this greatly deprecated "Hobgoblin," what is it? It may after all be only "the survival of the fittest," in the political field. The battle of the giants usually ends in that way, in nature, in politics, science and art, in morals, and in religion. As long as the body politic falls into several spheres, callings, and professions, such as theology, law, medicine, commerce, finance, trade, literature, etc., certain well-defined economies,—so long the challenges for mastery will go forth, and so long may we expect them to be heeded too; yea, and to be responded to "according to the measure of individual ability and energy." "Many are called, whilst few are chosen," here as everywhere. The crying evil of the day is, not too many masters; but the want of Masters, rather. The nearer and the more men become "Masters," the better the day for the masses. Experts are highly sought after, in all departments; whilst quacks and empirics bode society no good.

Political science is a profession, a calling, a grand, necessary and noble sphere. Political masters are political experts. The Nation suffers forever, whether in war or in times of peace, so long as these are not called to the helm. The late Civil War had been a protracted martyrdom and torture, until the masters of the sword and the pen advanced to the front. Nor has it ever been known, that any country suffered from having had too many experts in the lead of popular affairs. Such characters usually have too large personal interest at stake, to say nothing of their experience and tact, to run the Nation ashore. It is when the affairs of the country are set over with demagogues,

who cannot lead the masses, after all, that the danger comes. "Wo to thee, O land, when thy king is a child!"

An older and conservative class of citizens is convinced, that Mammonism is daily slaying the Republic. "We are a mammon-struck people," they tell us. "The passion for wealth is consuming us. The worship of the dollar, by millions of it, is growing stronger constantly. The rich are wanting to be richer still, and the poor are becoming poorer. We elevate shoddy and petroleum over worth and virtue. Successful speculation and peculation bid defiance to law and morals. *Eclat* is given to dishonesty and knavery. Corruption pervades private and public life. We are a Nation of shop-keepers and money-mongers—virtually dead to every kind of higher life, and only awaiting the funeral pyre."

How often must we forgive men for not knowing what they say? Mammonism is the worshipping of money, as such. And that is just what we, as a people, are not doing. It were better did we engage a little in that kind of devotion. The worth of money is too little known among us. The Oriental kings were mammonists, and still are. They hoard treasures of it, in piles and pyramids. In former ages, mankind was much more given to hoarding wealth. As a rule, modern society does not hoard; least of all, the Americans. An American tourist is known among the guides and porters of other countries, for spending largely. The money-mongers are a small company in our young Republic. Now and then we hear of a miser, and he is posted as a curiosity. We can hardly realize, how a mortal can die amid squalidness, near a large chest full of wealth. And surely these rare characters do not give complexion to society; they do not constitute the community. Hence, it is a mis-nomer, to apply to ourselves the stigma of mammon-worshippers. The elder son in the Parable, who fretted over the loss of the calf, and the wine; who pouted and begrudged the total cost of the family re-union, he is not our fit representative, by any means. The Republic will never die of parsimony. Many of "Young America's" spirits do not think enough of a dollar to keep it

over night. Parents find it a task, to accustom their offspring to a saving-bank. Money-mania is not a constitutional disease with us. We do not worship the "golden calf," nor the "golden eagle;" nor alas! "the golden rule"—no!—I had almost said: we are fast turning into a people, that does not worship anything!

But we must listen with respect and patience to those who maintain, that luxury is our road to National ruin. It cannot be denied, that the cry: "What shall we eat, drink, or wear?" is heard loudest over the land. We spend our money as a tale that is told, all of it, oftentimes, and sometimes, more than all of it. We might find it difficult to deny, that in general extravagance, our democratic Republic exceeds that of any other people. But let us not forget, at the same time, that the unfortunate Prodigal after experiencing sore trials, and heart-felt *ennui*, during his short summer-day, did still not die in consequence of his prodigality. He survived, notwithstanding. He retraced his steps homeward, and re-entered his father's house, a wiser and a happier man. Thence his life opened anew.

The Prodigal is a representative of our Luxury-loving people. It is a dangerous road to walk over. But it is not necessarily a fatal one. A spend-thrift is certainly a foolish man; but, as a rule, we do not find him to be a wicked man. It is to be remembered, that the Parable gives us more hope for the Prodigal son, than for his miserly brother. So too, are extravagant Nations better-hearted,—larger-souled communities than a commonwealth of misers and money-mongers. Misfortune, bankruptcy, with their usual barnacles, do indeed follow in the wake of luxury; yet these experience prove a whip to repentance, at last, and, as with a lash of hot scorpions, drive men back from ruin. Out of tribulation springs salvation. A close-walled and pent-up China will die eating rats and birds-nests, before our Republic still, fond of luxury as its citizens may be.

"But did not Rome die of luxury?" Yes; but it was of the luxury of its Rulers and Nobility; and by no means, of the ease and fatness of the commonalty, the populace, or the masses.

We must pay for all our follies, doubtless, but it is hard to see, how this great Republic can die of sweet-meats. It has, at all events thus far, not moved the masses greatly, though great inconveniences attend the manner of living beyond one's income; and it is likely the rule will not be abandoned. The masses have heard somehow, that one of the fundamentals of popular government is "the pursuit of happiness," and they are not yet convinced of the fact, that happiness is not to be attained by their adopted manner of living.

There are patriots "to the manor born," who see the life-blood of the Republic running out under the heel of Foreign Emigration. They tell us some important facts:—"Two thousand foreigners land on our shores, daily. They dot our Western lands with towns, often within the time of a single year. In ten years a new Philadelphia springs up; a Chicago; another Cincinnati or San Francisco. They control the elections by their votes. They change our National conscience, sentiments, manners, customs, habits—our entire organization."

"Many of them are fugitives from justice; revolutionists; rationalists; atheists; nihilists. What ship may bear such a cargo on and on? Upward of 800,000 foreigners, in 1881! They arrive from France, England, Ireland, Scotland, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Russia, Austria, Denmark, China, Turkey, Italy, Sicily, Wales, Hungary, Switzerland, Cuba, and all parts of the world! Their spirit of dictation manifests itself most impudently too. During the month of December, of the last year, a 'Socialist Labor Congress' held its sessions at Baltimore, for the purpose of considering ways and means of improving the condition and government of mankind in the world, in general, and in America, in particular. The Philadelphia Press calls the attention of its readers to the 'outlandish' names of the delegates, and remarks facetiously:—'The broad and comprehensive knowledge which these gentlemen possess of America, its condition, crudities and necessities, is best indicated by their names, which, our readers will observe, are purely and thoroughly American—having been naturalized, no

doubt, fully ten or twelve months ago.' The guttural catalogue runs thus:—Herman Walter, William Kempke, George Lehr, William Herker, Henry Frank, H. Mulkenbahn, Louis Schick, Aug. Kalding, Gotleib Hahn, Ernst Bauer, Louis Werner, Ernest Donath, and Richard Bartsch."

We may well ask, whether all this widely expressed apprehension of danger is only an infatuation or delusion? No one will venture to dismiss it in such a summary way, we think. No good citizen is wholly indifferent as to the result of such a vast influx of such a heterogeneous composition. Who is not curious to foresee, whether, Foreign Emigration may not be another Trojan horse?

But whatever be the final result, a Democratic Republic dare not repudiate its own fundamental principles of liberty and equality for all, without a suicidal surrender. Nor may many of us be too exclusive, lest we slap our own ancestry in the face. Those who have not Indian blood coursing through their veins, are remote or immediate descendants of foreign sires. How many of our Summer tourists delight to visit the European home-steads of their forefathers. There are very many family-trees planted in American households, whose roots have foreign earth clinging to them.

Besides, we may not forget, that along with the alloy and dross, an untold mass of good blood, muscle, labor, and heart empties itself into the lap of the Republic. Our furnaces, mines, rail-roads, manufactories, prairie-lands, cities and churches are standing monuments of their diligence and worth. Foreign powers deprecate their heavy loss. They beg, bribe and threaten against such an enormous exodus.

And again; the offspring of this foreign parentage become natives, at once with all. It is noteworthy that foreigners have children—many of them; and want to have them! And in consequence of our wonderful plastic power, all these are Americanized, as by magic. Chester A. Arthur had barely been born on our threshold, but that did not prevent him from reaching the Presidential chair. To such an honorable position

an, all but, foreign-born child may attain in the American Republic!

Is it not our oft-repeated boast too, that this Republic is the asylum for the bound and oppressed of all lands? It is claimed loudly, that Providence has opened the door of this country for every people. A more interesting National Temple does not exist on the face of the earth, in this view. The God of Nations proves within the bounds of our national theater, that, He made of one blood all the nations of men, by forming one people of all peoples. History illustrates the truth of Revelation.

We would rather risk all the perils confronting us in consequence of foreign emigration, than have the Republic's prestige robbed of this feature. The Legend:—*E PLURIBUS UNUM*—is symbolical. As long, therefore, as there are so many homeless and landless men and households elsewhere; and so much land and room for homes here, so long we may take it, that destiny is at work, under God, and will solve the problem, whether according to our preconceived notions or not. Hence, all our fears may be tinged with hope. And whoever will not possess his soul in patience, but is in constant perplexity over the annoying question of foreign emigration, might perhaps find some consolation in the suggestion, that inasmuch as hundreds of ships are leaving our shores without any emigrants for other lands, it were well to try the experiment of taking passage abroad, until the war is over. There are many countries that are not troubled with the problem of Foreign Emigration, let him know.

There are living in this age and country, plain men, of good common sense and large hearts, who anticipate an end of the Republic to result from Surplus-Science.

We are, we think, not mistaken in the fact, that there is a suspicion among the un-educated, the half-educated, and even among the educated citizens, concerning a "knowledge that puffeth up," even to a collapse. A strong indictment of many counts is drawn up against the idolatry of learning. It assumes

a form of this nature: "Our over-much learning taboos labor, by emptying the fields of plowers, sowers and reapers. It reflects on trades and handicrafts. It crowds the professions with uncalled incumbents. It creates unrest and dissatisfaction in many minds, in regard to their proper location and sphere. It drives young families from their ancestral home-steads, and their sires into bankruptcy. It shelves the Catechism, the Prayer-Book and the Bible. It divorces the soul from faith, devotion, and God. It secularises society. One or more generations, and the old Corinthian motto will become the current one: 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.'"

A studied silence against this declaration, or an ear open to it, through an obliging condescension, or even the weapon of ridicule, can hardly be admitted as a sufficient answer. The charge is an old one; uttered long ago and boldly; and maintained amid the light of multiplied school-houses, seminaries, social light-houses, and the ever increasing glare of bibliolatry. It does in no sense die of sun-shine, as it was surely thought by us, years back. Nor will its point be turned, by suffering it to strike against the shield on which is written: "A little learning is a dangerous thing!" Just by burying its tip therein, does the shaft seem to gain poignancy at its burning-point. We are then reminded of the fact, that it is just that "little learning" which is feared. The great learning, and the still greater degree of it, is not so wide-spread, and is usually in conservative and trusty hands. But the subject really assumes the shape of a problem that challenges our respect, when it confronts us with the query: Is that state of society, in which men must ever be content to "see men as trees walking," preferable to that social order, in which the masses are content to walk by the light of tradition and faith? As long as the hope may not be cherished, of promoting the multitude beyond the confessedly dangerous breakers of the "little learning," so long we do not consider the charge alleged against intellectual in-filling, as wholly groundless. And since every child is fated to begin

where the father started, it is not so readily seen, just when the danger will be passed.

The only antidote to the evil of "a little learning" spread out and over a wide surface, must be sought for, in the faithful endeavors of the Commonwealth and the Church, to have the mental food well seasoned with virtue. Washington found the Republic's preservatives in "Virtue and Intelligence." He was wise in that he assigned to Virtue the first rank, and placed Intelligence in the rear. Intelligence never yet saved a single Nation; nor will it preserve the Republic. That is not the salt of society. There lies a greater mass of knowledge, or science, buried through the fall of empires, than the bowels of the earth hold gold, silver, and precious stones. Lost arts and sciences lie one hundred feet under ground and under the waters of the oceans. Layer on layer of these are entombed, without any power of resurrecting themselves. However much we may ring the changes on the epigram, "Knowledge is power," it is wholly powerless to preserve a Nation from dissolution, or to raise upright again a once supine People.

Eliminate Virtue from the curriculum of the School, from the Kinder-Garten to the University, and the Republic will be all the shorter-lived, unless history and experience go for nought in the study of political economy. The Hon. Richard Vaux, in his discourse on "The Educational Problem," asserts that "mere Athenian learning will only lead to Athenian corruption, and that an educated, unregenerate human nature will be but educated vice." It is refreshing to hear him teach, that the verities of Christianity must be held to, as the basis of our personal, social, and national life; and that cut loose from these, the ship of state must wreck, as there is nothing else to which it can anchor. The figs that might be gathered from thistles, would necessarily be worse than no figs at all; and the grapes plucked from thorns, as well. Consequently, the un-formed mind is less potent for evil, than the mal-formed, or the monstrously de-formed, if we may argue from the statistics which philanthropists present, concerning the victims of crime. The

proportion of criminals in our Penitentiaries no longer tells in favor of the number who are drilled in the "Three R's."

The long-lived prejudice against Knowledge, then, is not entertained against Learning, as such; it is rather directed against a Melchisedekian knowing, "without father or mother." Even the Ancients never underrated Wisdom; it was the godless learning that was and is, with good reason, suspected. Nor may we ridicule as entirely groundless, the suspicion that has been so tenaciously harbored, and in the face of increasing light, that the black angels possess no more efficient weapon, by which to destroy the vitals of society, or the soul of a Nation, than an order of Knowledge-without-Virtue affords them. The hope of the Republic, then, lies in vigorously applying the only antidote to a bane so universally conceded.

The fundamental peril of the Republic is, perhaps, Political Atheism. The proofs for this proposition are numerous and striking. We venture to state a number of the most evident.

All Government is either of Divine, or Human origin. To which source may we most plainly trace it? In the Sacred Scriptures, we read:—"Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers: for there is no power but of God; and the powers that be are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, withstandeth the ordinance of God." (Romans xiii. 1 & 2.) It is evident, that the Divine origin of Government is taught by St. Paul. Though no one form of government is pronounced to be of such high derivation; nothing being said in favor of an order of Theocracy, Democracy, Aristocracy, or Monarchy; and nothing being declared in reference to the sanctity of the official incumbent, be he Emperor, King, Prince, or President:—it is plainly insisted on, that the right or authority to govern at all, in the Family, State, or Church, is of God.

And this thought is likewise illustrated by the teachings of the Ancients, with whom it was never a question, whether the right to govern emanated from men, or had been delegated to man, of God. In truth, Pagan, Jew, Mahommedan, and

Christian, all are unanimous on this point, whatever variety their histories exhibit on all other subjects. A recognition of the Supreme Ruler, as the fountain-head of all government, is patent, whether He be known as Jupiter, Zeus, Jehovah, Allah, or God. Plato says:—"Religion is the foundation of human society." Plutarch exclaims:—"It is easier to build a city in the air, than to found society without a belief in the Gods." Rousseau confesses:—"No State was ever established without Religion as a foundation." Voltaire writes:—"Religion is on all accounts necessary wherever society exists."

All ancient Legislation rested on a Divine basis. Cæsar having one day spoken irreverently of the Gods, in open senate, Cato and Cicero arose together, and accused him of having spoken words fatal to the Republic. It is difficult to open a single page on early Jurisprudence, on which it is not recorded, almost in plain words:—"By Me Kings reign and Princes decree justice!"

For the political economist there can be no more interesting question, than—*What is Government?* In the bosom of every Nation resides a mysterious power, by which citizens cohere and form a body politic. By virtue of this same mysterious power, one commonwealth adheres to other commonwealths, and all together constitute the family of nations—a galaxy as grand as the Solar system. Before this power, men bow down. To it, they pay tribute. For its rightful manifestation and administration, they pray, fight; and die.

This singular power enables men to buy and sell; to marry and to divorce; to imprison and to set at liberty; to take life and to spare it.

Would we know where this power enshrines itself, it must be sought for in and under the various coverings of municipal and civil canons and ordinances, since it is itself invisible, immutable, and eternal. Like the old "Common law," it is not written on parchment, but is engraved on the constitution of society, in the heart of the Race. As the Laws of Nature, it is infused into mankind, like blood in the veins, vision in the

eye, strength in muscle, thought in the mind, or the soul in the body.

If we, then, proceed to inquire after the origin and source of this power, which assumes such a variety of forms, and arrogates to itself such important rights and prerogatives, all theology, tradition, Scripture, history, and common sense, agree in tracing it back to God, the Supreme Ruler, and fountain of all power. And the solution seems as reasonable and fair as it is to attribute the potences and forces in the natural Universe to the creating hand of Nature. Hence, it may be answered: *Government is Eternal Justice ruling through the People, by the People, and for the People.*

It has been plainly enough taught, by the writers on political Economy, that this God-delegated power is permitted to crystallize itself in accordance with the environments of every separate community. A Monarchy, an Aristocracy, or a Democracy, may be a perfectly legitimate order or form of government, accordingly as the constitution of a People may chance to be. An American will and ought to maintain, that the Republican form is the best possible form for his country and people. And if he is asked for the reason for such a conviction, he can only reply: "The constitution of my people is of a Republican-Democratic order." Beyond that, he cannot intelligently go.

It is necessary, however, to know what is meant by the *Constitution of a People*. It is usual to mean by the familiar term "Constitution," the written or published copy of our Country's Laws. Beyond that, it is very seldom that our legislators and statesmen think of going. And hence it is too, that the State, and Union Congress imagine that they are engaged in the easy business of making, or amending the Constitution of the people, whenever they attempt to enact additional rules or ordinances for the Nation.

A moment's reflection, we think, will enable us to see, that the engrossed instrument of a People's channels of government, is no more the Constitution of that People, than is the inscribed Deed, or Mortgage anything more than a *Memorandum*, of an

act done or pledged to be done. The parties transacting a conveyance of real estate would hardly be satisfied with the parchment or paper on which a pledge or promise is made, were it not a memorial of an important matter going before. But that transaction itself cannot be written. It is a thing done; and all the notes men make concerning it, are simply memorative.

We are now prepared to say, that the Constitution of a People or Nation is, *the living soul of a People*; that which constitutes it a Commonwealth; affords it a common life; which renders it different from all other Nations; and which enables it to perform national functions.

It were about as easy a task, to write out the soul of man, as to represent the living spirit, the *Esprit De Corps*, of a Nation on paper. It can only become manifest in the history of a People.

Who breathed the National soul into a People? Verily, He who breathed a living soul into the first human pair. Whatever Nation came to the surface, in the world's history, received its constitution of the God of Nations. The generative principle of every political constitution is of Divine Providence; and were it not for the perversity of human nature, every Nation would be happy, in proportion as it develops its God-inspired national spirit.

The American Constitution was a predetermined order for our People, by Providence, and not an arrangement of the "political fathers." We are a Providential Nation, so far as soul and destiny are in question; and in no sense a theater on which demagogues may try their hand at political experiments, nor another Paradise simply, for Satan to spoil. It was surely not of accident or chance, that the Commonalty emigrated, and that the Nobility remained back. A Commonalty without a Nobility is Republicanism, at once. That very fact imposed Republicanism upon the Colonies, and afforded the soul, which animates the Nation to this day, and must so continue to indwell it, as long as the Nation is to be a Nation. No People ever had any more say or choice, as to their Constitution, than they had over the course of a planet.

We maintain then, that our political constitution, our Providential organization, as generated by our national life, spirit, conscience, habits, manners, and customs,—all this is not irreligious or atheistic, but of *Divine origin and ordering*. The Common Law underlies our whole legal polity, and reverberates through the History of the Nation, as the orderings of Providence, however much the statutory interference of man may overlay its utterings. Our traditions embody the Divine elements. Hence, we allege, that the American theory holds to the Divine origin of Government.

We will certainly be asked, whether the Declaration of Independence does not loudly affirm the *Human origin of Government*?

The principle of its popular derivation seems to lay transparently in the now household phrase:—"All Government derives its just power from the consent of the governed." And that our citizens heartily endorse the theory of its popular origin, seems sufficiently evident from the ready response uttered to the famous saying of the first martyr-President at Gettysburg, when he spoke so grandly of a Government "of the people, by the people, and for the people."

To save the Democratic principle of popular Government from being written down as atheistic, it is necessary to distinguish between the Origin of Government, on the one hand, and its Administration on the other. The source of this mysterious power is something separate and distinct from the form which it assumes, or the channel through which it flows. And from all the positions which the writers on the subject have taken, during the formative period of the Republic, it becomes manifest, that both the noted declarations quoted, were made to apply to the popular administration of Government, rather than to the fountain out of which it issues.

Nor can any loyal Christian citizen of the Republic demur against the principle asserted, as irreligious and ungodly, when so applied and interpreted. The Republic needs and hails a government, popular in its type, form, or administration. It is just the form which is adapted to the constitution of the

country, and it is just the form, without which the Republic cannot do, if it is not soon to be numbered with the Nations that were. To change the fundamental-order of a Commonwealth, is to destroy its very existence.

The peril of the Republic, then, does not lie in the principle of the 'fathers,' so long as its force is limited to the organs of our Government's Administration; but it does at once set in, the moment the theory is made to cover its source and derivation. The demagogue, who boasts of the origia of Government "in the convention," as the phrase runs, extends the doctrine back to its very root, and thereby declares himself to be a political atheist. He ignores all power above the masses, and knows nothing of "higher laws," or of the still higher source of it. Accordingly, as his theory is hailed and lauded, as the true one, by the multitude, in that measure does political atheism become current—the chief peril of the Republic.

On this text Carlyle preaches a sermon:—"You man, you Nation, if you do not love Truth; if you try to make a chapman-bargain with Truth, instead of giving yourself soul and body to her; Truth will not live with you; Truth will depart from you; and only Logic, Wit, and Sophistry, the Aesthetic Arts—and perhaps Book-keeping by double entry, will abide with you. You will follow Falsity, and think it Truth—you unfortunate man or Nation. You will, right surely, stumble to the Devil; and are every day and hour, little as you imagine it, making progress thither."

It may be asked, now, whether the Republic has, at all, entered on such a perilous road?

There are those, who see ominous marks of a decline in the religiosity of their country's character. A melancholy strain is given forth, in this direction.

"The Divine Origin of Government is questioned and denied. Our Rulers boast of ranking with the Agnostics, quite largely and loudly. Our Legislatures recognize no King, save the Sovereign People. Our laws constitute a code of Police-regulations. Government has been reduced to the level of a Comptrolership of Commerce, Finance, Business. Crimes are Mis-

fortunes. Criminals are "Crank's." Iniquities are Insanities. The *Imprimatur* of majesty has faded out on the Escutcheon of the Republic. Society has caught the contagion from above. The Church and the School are in twain. Revelation and Science are antagonistic. Religion and Morals are divorced. Capital and Labor are at war. American Citizenship means a heterogeneous population. Patriotism is but Partizanship. Statesmanship is office-mongering. Success is a cardinal virtue. Conspicuousness is greatness. Nobility means millions of dollars. Corruption has become a National blood-poisoning. Contentment has forsaken the hearth and home. Divorces multiply in all directions. Ananias and Sapphira are playing a game of "hide and keep" unblushingly. The Family-life runs copiously over into the boarding-house, club and the lodge. The church is fast secularizing. The Lord's Day is denationalizing. Worship is an entertainment. The insidious march of political atheism is making itself manifest in the repristination of the motto: — 'Ignorance is the mother of Devotion.' "

This is the catalogue of evil omens, that is enrolled by citizens, with whom the wish is by no means a father to the thought!

To be sure, men who so read and interpret the condition of the Republic, are readily and summarily declared to be croakers, cynics, or disappointed Nation-menders. "Never mind them," we are told.

Nevertheless, since the late Civil War, we are the more ready to believe in unwelcome possibilities. How long had threats of dis-union been smilingly heard! "There will be no bloodshed, nor secession!" was confidently spoken. And yet, all this came, and came to stay, far beyond the "sixty days."

It was a common thing, to commiserate the potentates of other countries, when a regicide startled the world. We wept and rejoiced, at the same time. Wept, because "uneasy lies the head that wears the crown"; and rejoiced over the fact, that such barbarities could never occur in the Republic. Alas! we number already two Martyr-Presidents!

Communism and Nihilism were exotics, we loudly preached.

A Republican climate was thought to be too unfavorable to such growths. But strike follows strike; mobs and riots made themselves a success, in more than one instance. The foreign gospel is earnestly discoursed from the text:—"Wealth is robbery!"; "Governments are shackles!"

We are, therefore, not so confident, that no perils are in store for the Republic, from this direction, if it may be taken as a fact, that the theory of Popular Origin of Government is really held to and taught, by the leaders and the masses. Political Atheism is the only fatality any Nation has ever died of. All other evils, that may seriously affect a commonwealth's life, always correct themselves, sooner or later; but the political doctor has not yet come to the front, who is able to neutralize the effects of that law:—"The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the Nations that forget God." Put asunder what Providence has joined together:—God and Government; Justice and law: Cons-science and Conduct; Religion and politics;—and the Republic starts on the down grade, in spite of all the brakes the statesman may devise.

"Your house is left unto you desolate," was said by our Lord, to a people infatuated by the dazzling glare of their own greatness. Forty years later, "the rains descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew," and Jerusalem, "the joy of the whole earth," fell to rise no more.

The human mind oftentimes refuses to anticipate the possibility of a calamity, from its very largeness. The destruction of a Nation and the doom of the World are such facts. It is by the *post-mortem* examination of subterranean People, defunct Civilizations, and Cities in ruins, that we may approximate to such a reality. And surely, modern society has sufficient opportunity to read the fate of Nations that once stood erect, and promised to endure through all the ages, but whose places know them no more forever. And if even all is not lost, that is in danger, a wise and prudent people will not be indifferent toward any perils, and especially not in regard to the Gorgon-peril—Political Atheism.

VI.

LIFE AND IMMORTALITY.

BY A. A. PFANSTIEHL.

PAPER TWO.

"Jesus Christ hath brought life and immortality to light through the gospel."
II. Tim. 1: 10.

WE desire in this article to speak about the blessedness of the facts stated by Paul in the above quotation. The subject being of a practical nature, our treatment of it will of necessity be practical.

In order to have the whole subject come before us, we recapitulate. We spoke in the October 1883 number of this REVIEW about the two facts stated by Paul, viz.: that Jesus Christ brought (a) life, and (b) immortality to light through the gospel, showing that Jesus is said to have removed every doubt in regard to these transcendently important matters. We endeavored to show that though men always believed in the immortality of the soul, and though the doctrine can be proven from reason only to be not only possible, but also so probable that we cannot but believe in it, though we did not have a distinct, clear and full revelation of it in Jesus, yet we needed something more. We showed from (a) the universality of the doctrine, (b) the illimitable powers and prospects of the soul, which are not satisfied with this life only, (c) the continued activity and life of the soul, though the body decays and fails daily, and (d) from the analogy of Nature, that the immortality of the soul cannot be doubted.

And yet this was not enough. We needed more. This told us only, that the immortality of the soul is a fact. What we needed to complete the statement for our encouragement and cheer,

was some one to tell us what that immortality is. The One who told us about this was Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the world. He came to bring "life and immortality to light through the gospel," telling us not only *that* we are to live forever, but also *how* we can live happily, eternally in the immediate presence of our God, in an everlasting home prepared by Him for His believing children. He brought this to light in two ways: 1st. By distinct declarations of it, 2nd. By the fact of His resurrection; which ways are as full, and complete, and blessed as we need. We speak now of the blessedness of the above facts. Wherein does the blessedness of these things consist?

I. *In the fact of the fullness of the revelation made.* We have in Jesus Christ the Saviour all the light on this subject we can possibly need or require. To ask for more light, in view of that which we have, which is so cheerfully luminous on this subject, would be as unreasonable and as foolish as for a man to ask for more light in Nature than the sun gives us. Nay, it is sheer querulousness to ask for more light or require more. We have been distinctly taught in regard to our immortality. Jesus made it as plain as day to us that the believer's future life will consist in his being at home forever in his Father's mansion. Now, how can we reasonably, or legitimately require more light on this subject?

Let us look a little further into the fullness of the light Jesus came to bring. It consists in that He not only brought a spiritual life, a life in God to light, but also an immortal life with God.

Now the first question in regard to the future existence of the soul is this: *Will there be a future life at all?* In other words, is there a continued spiritual life of the soul, distinct from the life in the body? This was the question which the ancients tried to settle; and it was the only question in regard to this matter which they could satisfactorily settle without a revelation of it. *Is there to be a future life?* Yes! Then, what kind of life is it? Now, this is the second question in

regard to this matter, which can be answered only by revelation. And the blessedness of Christ's revelation consists in the fact that this question has been answered by Him.

Men were, even in their most convinced state of mind in regard to this, perplexed with doubts; for, having had no direct revelation of it, distinct and full, they could not be certain of the fact. Barnes in his notes on II. TIM. 1: 10 says: "The hope of a future is styled by Cicero, *Futorum quodam auguriam sæculorum*—a conjecture, or surmise of future ages. Seneca says it is that which our wise men do promise, but they do not prove. * * * Cicero begins his discourse on the subject with a profession that he intended to deliver nothing as fixed and certain, but only as probable, and as having some likelihood of truth. And, having mentioned the different sentiments of philosophers, he concluded,—'Which of these opinions is true, some god must tell us; which is most like to truth, is a great question?'"

If such grave doubts existed in the mind, of the mere fact of a future life, how blessed is it that these are removed from our minds by the light of the gospel. But then add to this the fact of a revelation having been given to us of what kind of a future it is that awaits the believer, and we have a blessedness of statement which should truly make us eternally grateful to our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. For this is revealed by Jesus, viz.: that it is an *immortality* that awaits the soul; which word, ἀθάρα means incorruption, exemption from decay. (See Robinson's Lex. of the N. T.) We have, therefore, not only *life* brought to light through the gospel, but also *immortality*—*life and immortality*—a life incorruptible, not subject to decay or change as this present life is, but a life immortal in the presence of God. What more could we wish? Oh! Thou Light of the world, we thank Thee that Thou didst shed Thy divine beams into the darkness of the grave, which illumine the tomb, and reveal unto us a happy change for us hereafter. With the light Thou didst cast before Thee so that we can look beyond the veil which hides the life to come from us, we behold no

graves; no tomb-stones in the land of the blest, to mark the spots where were laid those who were dear to each other; no wintry winds moan sad dirges over dreary graves there; no tears are shed over lost ones buried in dismal graves there; but all live on forever and ever, in ever increasing blessedness and joy with Thee in heaven. We thank Thee that, when "as fair a trial had been made among the philosophers of Greece and Rome as could be made, to determine whether the unaided powers of the human mind could arrive at these great truths; and their most distinguished philosophers confessed that they could arrive at no certainty on the subject," Thou didst come in all Thy love and grace, and didst shed Thy divine light far and near, clearing all doubts, dispelling all fears, removing all uncertainties on the subject, and that the rays of this light penetrate even into the darkness of our hearts.

II. Another feature of the blessedness of the revelation of Jesus lies in the fact that a *personal immortality* has been brought to light. *

Does our immortality consist in being "absorbed into the Infinite Spirit, as the falling rain-drop is swallowed up in the far stretching sea," then wherein lies the blessedness to the individual of his future life? This is really no immortality at all. At least, no immortality of which the soul can be conscious: the person, the *ego* is lost completely in the *sum total* of Being. When, as Emerson says of man, that at last "he enters deeper into God, God into him, until the last garment of egotism falls,"—what is this but saying that the soul loses all personality? And with the loss of personality goes the loss of any and all power or capacity to enjoy, to praise, to glorify God.

Now, Jesus Christ brought a personal immortality to light through the gospel; a future life in which the soul loses none of its personality, but gains it in a higher, a completer, a grander, more glorious sense. When the school of Spiritualistic Pantheism tells us that Jesus "is very abstemious of explanation, He never preaches the *personal immortality*"—what

is this but in direct conflict with the truth? All the teachings of Christ on this subject, as well as of His Apostles, and also the fundamental consensus of the race, are distinctly concerning a personal immortality. "The vast majority who believe in the life to come, believe in it as a life for each individual being, essential to its personal identity, and necessarily so in order to receive its due reward or punishment." This "was evidently the view of Schiller, of Michael Angelo, of Bacon, of Montesquieu, of Franklin, of Van Helmont, and of Ruskin—all of whom he (Emerson) presents as strenuous advocates of the truth of immortality." (*Prof. S. M. Shute.*)

What mean the descriptions in the Bible of heaven if not that there will be personalities to dwell there? True, sometimes the Bible meaning of the word heaven is a *state*, rather than a *place*; as for example, when the believer is said to be delivered from the power of darkness, and translated into the kingdom of God's dear Son. "We are therefore said even in this world to be 'in heaven' as in Eph. ii: 6, where it is said, God 'hath raised us up together (with Christ), and made us sit together ($\epsilon\nu\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\pi\omicron\upsilon\rho\alpha\nu\iota\omicron\iota\varsigma=\epsilon\nu\ \tau\tilde{\omega}\ \omicron\upsilon\rho\alpha\nu\tilde{\omega}$, agreeably to the constant usage of that Epistle) in heavenly places,' *i. e.*, in heaven." *

But more frequently—and this is its general scriptural meaning—it means the place where God dwells, where Jesus, as the Theanthropos, sits at the right hand of God, where the holy angels dwell, where the spirits of the just made perfect dwell. Now this cannot possibly mean that heaven is a mere *state*.

In the first chapter of Acts we have a full account of the ascension of Jesus into heaven. There we learn that He was "taken up" before the eyes of the disciples, until a cloud received Him, and hid Him from their sight. On this Dr. Hodge says: "From this account it appears, (1) That the ascension of Christ was of His whole person. It was the Theanthropos, the Son of God, clothed in our nature, having a true body and a reasonable soul, who ascended. (2) That the ascen-

* See Hodge's Sys. Theol. Vol. ii. p. 631.

sion was visible. The disciples witnessed the whole transaction. They saw the person of Christ gradually rise from the earth, and go up until the cloud hid Him from their view. (3) It was a local transfer of His person from one place to another; from earth to heaven. Heaven is therefore a place."

Jesus said to His disciples, a little while before His death: "In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so I would have told you. *I go to prepare a place for you* (John xiv: 2-3)—Προεβόμαι ἐτοιμάσαι τόπον ὑμῖν." In Robinson's Lexicon of the New Testament, we read: "τοπος—a place, space, locus, *e. g.* 1. As occupied or filled by any person or thing, a place, spot, space, room. 2. Of a particular place, spot, where one dwells, sojourns, belongs, *e. g.*, of persons, a dwelling-place, abode, home." And he cites the passage in John xiv: 2. (See also 2 Cor. v: 8.) "We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Upon which Bickersteth comments: "present like a citizen at home in his own country, and not a co-existence only in the same locality." (*Blessed Dead*, p. 24). Now, what does all this mean if not a localization of heaven?—a place where God specially manifests His presence, and "where He is surrounded by the angels (who, not being infinite, cannot be ubiquitous) and by the spirits made perfect," where the glorified saints will hold communion with God, undisturbed by sin,—perfect, holy communion, and where they will associate with one another in ever blessed fellowship, and commune with the patriarchs and prophets. (*Matth. viii: 11.*)* And does not all this imply a personal immortality? To say therefore that Jesus never preached the personal immortality, and that He is very abstemious of explanation, is an unblushing perverting of the truth.

III. The blessedness of the revelation of Jesus of life and immortality consists further in the fact that light is shed *just where man needs it most, and could wish it most.*

*The above three or four paragraphs are taken from an article by the writer on Heaven in "*Sower and Mission Monthly*," of 1881, published by the Reformed (Dutch) Church.

Could anything of greater importance be revealed? Did man need light any where as much as just here? If man is to live forever; if this life is not all of life,—then can we conceive of anything more important than that the heavens should open and shed upon the world clear light in regard to the “life beyond life?” When we think but a single moment of the importance of light on this subject, our hearts must be hard as adamant, if they are not mellowed into tears of joy and gratitude to Jesus, because He brought “life and immortality to light through the gospel.”

It is said that twelve centuries ago, the Pagan Edward, the Anglo-Saxon king of Northumbria, was pleaded with by Paulinus, a Christian Bishop, “to abandon the Pagan faith of his forefathers, and adopt the religion so beautifully illustrated in the life of his Christian queen Ethelberga.” Edward yielded to the request of the Bishop that he should gather together his counsellors in his royal palace, where they could with him hear words of instruction, and could discuss with the Bishop the claims of the new religion and decide for himself and his people. The meeting was held. During the discussion, one of the king’s counsellors closed his plea before the king to adopt the new religion with these striking words: “The present life of man, O king, seems to me in comparison with the time which is unknown to us, like the swift flight of the sparrow through the room where you sit at the feast in winter with your counsellors and commanders, and a cheerful fire in the midst, while the storms of rain and snow prevail without. The sparrow, I say, flying in at one door and out at another, whilst he is within, is, for the moment, safe from the wintry storm; but after a short space of fair weather, he immediately vanishes out of your sight into the dark winter from which he had emerged. So this life of man appears for a short space, but of what went before or what is to follow we are utterly ignorant. *If, therefore, this new doctrine contains something more certain, it seems justly to deserve to be followed.*” *

* With reference to this scene Emerson opens his chapter on “Immortality.” See also Bap. Quar. Art. “Mortal or Immortal?” April 1876.

This "something more certain" we have in the light which Jesus shed on this subject. And we ought to bless God for it. We cannot appreciate it enough. How strange that any will refuse to accept of the Saviour seeing how blessed is His revelation on this most important subject.

Where could light do man more lasting good? A light from heaven to help us in our daily work would do us good only a short life-time; light on natural science does men good only for a day; light to reveal earthly wisdom is of no account in the grave;—but light divine of "life and immortality" does men good for all eternity; it guides one to the grave, aye, out of it, on, on, to heaven. If Archimedes had occasion to shout "Eureka," when he discovered the adulteration of King Hiero's crown, how much more becoming is it for poor, ignorant man to shout in joyful, grateful tones: "Eureka, Eureka," when by the light of God in Jesus Christ His Son, he discovers clearly, unmistakably a crown incorruptible in heaven awaiting him at the right hand of God—an imperishable garland wreathed by God's own divine hand!

IV. We remark again, that the blessedness of the fact that Jesus brought "life and immortality to light" may be seen from this, *that it removes all fear for the future from the believer's mind and heart, both for time and eternity.*

Now, this is surely a source of blessedness. A person who lives in uncertainty of the future cannot possibly be a happy man. He cannot with any degree of assurance, make any plans for the future; his heart is not encouraged to look hopefully into the future. For, what will the outcome be? Where will my path lead to? Will I immerge deeper and deeper into impenetrable darkness, or will I suddenly come to a stand still? Whither, ah! whither am I drifting? Such is his language.

One who walks in the light of the gospel, goes on steadily, no matter though his path be dark and dreary, because he knows that no matter how deeply he may immerge into the darkness and dreariness before him, yet, led by the light of a blessed Saviour, he will speedily emerge out of it into the

effulgent brightness of God in a blessed immortality. His prayer is in the words of Newman :

"Lead kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom,
Lead Thou me on ;
The night is dark, and I am far from home,
Lead Thou me on ;
Keep Thou my feet ; I do not ask to see
The distant scene : One step enough for me."

So long Thy power has blest me, sure it still
Will lead me on
O'er moor and fen, o'er crag and torrent, till
The night is gone ;
And with the morn, those angel faces smile
Which I have loved long since, and lost awhile."

How blessed, is it not ? that such language has been put into the mouth of weak, ignorant, erring children of men ! Would it ever have been put there had not Jesus Christ, the Light of the world, come to bring life and immortality to light ? What would we have known of the *home* from which we feel ourselves so far away ? How could we ever have hope that when the "night is gone" there will be a morn, where "the angel faces smile" which we "have loved long since, but lost awhile ?" How could we know but that they were lost forever, gone never to be seen or met again ? But now we know beyond a doubt about our future home, "where friend holds fellowship with friend ;" we know of the blessedness of the distant scenes which Jesus came to reveal to us in all their entrancing attractiveness and loveliness. We know of a morning that knows no night ; we know of a happy re-union of friends gone before, because Jesus "hath brought life and immortality to light through the gospel." How blessed all this ! By all the attractiveness of the distant scenes brought so near through Jesus ; by the eternal home awaiting God's children, by the gloomy darkness of the night in which we live here below, and the cheering brightness of the morning in heaven ; by the beckoning of the alluring pleasures at the right hand of God ;

by the happy meeting and greeting of friends awaiting us at the golden gates of heaven ; by the invitations of the Saviour to come to the light ; by the love and grace of God—by all this, shall not men be persuaded to give themselves in total self-surrender to the Saviour-God ?

V. The blessedness of our knowledge of immortality brought to light by Jesus, consists also in the fact that *it teaches us how to live and how to die.*

Because we know our true and exalted destiny as revealed to us in the gospel, we are enabled to shape our characters and lives accordingly.

Because of this, too, we know upon what to set our affections, and where our hearts ought to be. The things of this earth are fleeting. Earthly riches may at any time take unto themselves wings and fly away, or to us it may at any moment be said : "Thy soul is required of thee," and we thus be taken from them. Moth and rust doth corrupt nearly everything. Hence we can put no trust in things pertaining to this earth : we cannot rest our souls upon these with any degree of certainty and comfort. What, then, are we to do ? How are we to act and live, seeing these things are so ? We have an answer in the fact that "life and immortality have been brought to light through the gospel"—things imperishable, which moth and rust cannot corrupt. We have an answer in the words of Jesus : "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you." "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal ; but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal : for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also" (Matt. 6 : 19-21). Now what would all this mean to us, and could we ever have any reason to act thus, if "life and immortality had not been brought to light through the gospel," if heaven and its nature and blessedness had not been revealed ? Herein lies a blessed feature of Christ's revelation of eternal life, that it

teaches men that there are things eternal, incorruptible, joyous, upon which we can set our hearts, rather than the passing things of time, so that we can live for that which is worth living; for that which gives life a triumphant, glorious issue. Many find that they have made mistakes, sad and irreparable, when they come to the end of life and have spent all their energies and thought, all their time on things of time, and have neglected matters of eternity. Gibbon, in his "Roman Empire," says that the Caliph Abdalhaman, successor to Mahomet, lived in most magnificent greatness. In his palace were hung up 38,000 pieces of tapestry; 20,000 carpets were on the floor; he had 100 lions for his amusement; he was attended to the field by a guard of 12,000 horsemen, whose belts and cimeters were studded with gold. He had a tree of gold and silver spreading into eighteen large branches, on which, and on the lesser boughs, sat a variety of birds of the same precious metal, were also as the leaves of the trees. The several birds warbled their natural harmony, while machinery effected spontaneous motions. And yet, notwithstanding all this, he says: "I have now reigned fifty years, in victory and peace; beloved by my subjects, dreaded by my enemies, and respected by my allies; riches and honors, power and pleasure have waited on my call; nor does any earthly blessing appear to have been wanting to my felicity. In this situation, I have diligently numbered the days of pure and genuine happiness which have fallen to my lot. They amount to—FOURTEEN. O, man, place not thy confidence in this present world." When, therefore, there is that revealed to us which will be of true, pure and genuine, everlasting happiness to us in another world, in view of the little happiness which this world affords compared to what is revealed of the world to come, how foolish it is for us—what a great mistake it is for us to neglect eternal things, and attend only to passing things of earth! Surely, by the revelation of a future happy, joyous life, we are taught the true secret of a successful life.

But more. This revelation teaches us also how to die—not with trembling solicitude, as did the ancient philosopher in

despairing cry: "I was born polluted; I have spent my life anxiously, I die with trembling solicitude;" but trusting in the Saviour, calmly folding our hands upon our breast, closing our eyes as if in reposing sleep, with these words: "Into thy hands, O Father, I commit my spirit;" dying, in short, with a cheering hope of a happy immortality brought to light by Jesus Christ through the Gospel.

VI. Lastly. The blessedness of Christ's revelation of a future life may be seen from the fact that when we lay our dear ones, dying in the Lord, in the grave, we do so with a cheerful hope of meeting them again in an eternal home with God. Here is blessedness divine: here is soul-comforting blessedness. The body may be laid away from view forever, but the soul, glorified in heaven, awaits us with joyous anticipation at the golden gates. How could we bear these separations—how could we endure the pangs of last farewells—how could we survive the last kiss upon the icy forehead of our dear ones before the casket is closed, never to be opened again—if it were not for this cheering hope? How could we stand by the open grave, and see the dear ones lowered slowly, slowly down into the ground, and hear the hollow sound come up from the grave, as the earth falls upon the coffin, without a cheering hope that the soul is safe—without the Light which illumines the darkness of the grave and casts His beams far beyond it to a happy immortality in an everlasting home?

"Still one in life and one in death,
One in our hope of rest above;
One in our joy, our trust, our faith,
One in each other's faithful love.

"Yet must we part and, parting, weep;
What else hath earth for us in store?
Our farewell pangs, how sharp and deep;
Our farewell words, how sad and sore!

"Yet shall we meet again in peace,
To sing the song of festal joy,
Where none shall bid our gladness cease,
And none our fellowship destroy."

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VI.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

OEHLER'S OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY. An American Edition. Edited by Prof. Geo. E. Day, Yale College. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, Publishers, 10 and 12 Dey Street. 1883.

This work has been before the public in the German, and also in a translation into English in Clark's Foreign Theological Library, for some time, and its merits have been acknowledged.

The improved American edition has been edited with great care, and rare critical taste and judgment, by Prof. Day of Yale College, with special reference to the wants of theological students. The improvements upon the Edinburgh edition consist in:

1. A *thorough revision* of the English translation, in which errors are corrected, and passages obscurely rendered are made intelligible.
2. The incorporation of the *large amount of new matter* contained in the second German edition recently issued, and the notes of the American editor.
3. The *changing of the references* in order to make them conform to the English or American translations of German works, where such exist.
4. The *italicizing* of the words and sentences designed to be made prominent, as was done in the original, but was largely neglected in the Edinburgh translation.
5. The addition of an *unusually full index* of all the passages in the Old Testament referred to and explained, covering no less than thirteen pages, and helping to render the work a critical as well as doctrinal commentary in the study of the Hebrew Bible.

Biblical Theology in the proper sense is a comparatively new science. Only of late years has the distinction come to be sharply drawn between Dogmatic Theology and Biblical Theology. Dogmatic theology is, of course, biblical, in that it regards the Bible as the critical standard that rules in its whole treatment. Its immediate purpose, however, is, as its name indicates, to treat of the dogmas of Christian faith in systematic order, and according to scientific principles. For this purpose it employs human reason and human philosophy in giving it system and form. The *data* is given by revelation, but the form is from reason. Its treatment, however, is from the standpoint of faith, and thus the treatment is in the spirit of reason, enlightened by divine grace. Hence it is a human science, and in the nature of the case progressive. The contents of faith are brought into the sphere of knowledge. While the subject matter remains the same, yet the form of

stating and explaining particular dogmas, and the sum of Christian dogmas, undergoes changes as the human mind advances in knowledge, especially in philosophy.

Biblical theology has a different purpose in view, whether of the Old or New Testament. Its purpose is, not to treat revelation as a whole, and as to its results in an intellectual system, but rather to exhibit the principles involved in the history of revelation. Revelation is historical. It begins with the beginning of the world, and moves forward in word and act in the degree in which the world is prepared to receive it. God does not change, but man changes, and this change affects the relation between God and man. His revelation, therefore, adapts itself to this change of relation. This ought to be recognized at once from the fact of the Incarnation. Christ could not come until the fullness of time was come. Those who lived before Christ could not look at revelation in the same way that those regard it since He has come.

From which we easily come to see that there must have been progressive stages in the Old Testament revelation. This fact has not always been recognized. The idea of a historical movement in the revelation set forth in the Bible was first set forth after the Reformation, in the use of what was called the *federal theology* under the direction of Cocceius (b. 1603, d. 1669). He sought to find a principle by which the different stadia of revelation were governed, and he found this in the idea of the covenant, *foedus*, hence federal school. There was a covenant of works made with Adam, and a covenant of grace made with Christ. The unfolding of these covenants was the key to open the meaning of the history of revelation.

It is not the idea of the *covenant*, however, that is central in revelation, but the *person of Christ*. It is said to be one of the marked features of Oehler's Biblical theology that he weaves the whole history of the Old Testament into an organic unity of which the final expression is Christ. The ruling principle running through the Old Testament must be the coming of Christ.

Yet there are stages in this preparation. The idea of death and the intermediate state and eternal life, and of God as triune, etc., was not the same in all ages. Old Testament theology begins with the creation and gives us the manner in which revelation unfolded itself from the beginning. We have been pleased with the force with which Dr. Oehler supports the interpretation of the Bible over against the rationalistic interpretations on all the main points of Christian belief. He finds no doctrine of emanation or merely a genesis of the world, but a creation, a creation of the material as well as the reduction of the chaos to order. Nor does he find there a dualism, inasmuch as the Spirit joins God in living union with the world. So also in reference to the origin of sin, he finds there no theory of necessity, which in the end makes God to be the author of sin. The enticement

came from without, but man was free to resist it; hence so far as this world is concerned and man's history, sin has its origin in the possibility of free will. The doctrine of Satan is not as yet explicitly present in the history of the fall, or if there, only dimly, and veiled under a symbol. But gradually in the course of history a personal head of the realm of evil comes to light. When Christ came Satan was present as the tempter.

But we will not continue this notice further. While the work is designed specially for theological students, it is necessarily, also, of special interest to ministers, and even to intelligent laymen.

MANUAL OF REVIVALS. Practical Hints and Suggestions from Histories of Revivals and biographies of Revivalists, with Themes for the use of pastors and missionaries before, during, and after Special Services, including the Texts, subjects and outlines of The Sermons of many distinguished Evangelists. By Rev. G. W. Hervey, M. A., author of "A system of Christian Rhetoric, etc.," New York: Funk & Wagnalls, Publishers, 10 and 12 Dey Street.

We give the whole title of this volume because it presents so fully the contents of the book. In the chapter on "waiting for power from on high," while the author's own position is right, he might have saved himself a long and labored argument, if he had distinguished between the *charisms* of the Apostolic church and the ordinary office of the Holy Spirit. There would be as much reason to wait for the gift of speaking with tongues, as to wait for the power of the Holy Spirit in the sense referred to in this chapter.

For those who employ revivals in their ministerial work, this book will be a great help. We would prefer a book to show how revivals may be rendered unnecessary, that is, how to keep a congregation in a condition of steady growth, and how to awaken the impenitent at the ordinary services of the Lord's house. Yet revivals are a fact in our American Christianity.

Dr. Neander took so much interest in the revivals in New England under Jonathan Edwards and Whitefield, that he engaged one of his advanced students to write a history of them, and the result was one of the best little works on the early history of the church in that section extant. Perhaps we ought not to turn away from *all* kinds of revivals. It depends much on what they are. The Lord's people need to be revived and sinners awakened. But in many of our modern revivals there is such a strange mixing up of the *charismata*, the special gifts of the Spirit and His ordinary presence and working, that much deception is the result. There is something wrong in the whole attitude of waiting and praying for the Holy Ghost to come down as He did on the day of Pentecost. That coming was once for all. It can no more be repeated than the Incarnation can be repeated. Yet it is proper to pray for God's Spirit; but not to expect now the miraculous signs of His presence, any more than to expect miracles to be performed now as in the days of Christ.

Among the temptations to which Evangelists are exposed, the author quotes from Whitefield's diary that he was sometimes "puffed up" with success. It is said that Whitefield's diary was full of egotism, so much so that he could hardly write without speaking of and praising himself, not the best spirit, we should say, for one who seemed so pious and so anxious to convert every body else. Those revivalists used to be censorious towards others, presuming to be able to judge who were converted and who not. The Tennaunts of New Jersey had a good deal of that self-righteous spirit. Still this book is full of interest, even to one who does not believe in the sort

of revivals of which it treats. The texts and sketches of the great revivalists, among whom are here classed Moody and others of late date, as well as earlier ones, are of great interest. It is handsomely published.

THIRTY THOUSAND THOUGHTS. Edited by Rev. Canon Spence, Rev. J. S. Exell, Rev. C. Neill, and Rev. I. Stevenson. With an Introduction by Dr. Howson, Dean of Chester. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, Publishers. Price, \$3.50.

"This great work is a library in itself, and is the selected and combined result of researches made by scores of contributors who have passed in review thousands of books. The entire field of literature—Patristic, Mediæval, Puritanic, Modern, Classical, Foreign—has been made to yield up its choicest thoughts, bearing on Theological, Philosophical, Biographical, Biblical, Ecclesiastical, Ethical, and Practical Subjects, and the whole arranged upon a scientific basis for homiletic use. It is scarcely possible to convey a full idea of the character and value of this unique and immense work. It is a grand illustration book, combining the advantages of a "commonplace" book, homiletical "encyclopædia" or "dictionary" of illustrations, and a "compendium" of theological literature, the whole arranged for practical use by those who are too busy to search through libraries for what they need. It supplies a want that has been long and deeply felt, and it cannot fail to be of very great service to ministers and students and intelligent readers in general. The work will be completed in six volumes, although each volume is complete in itself. The one now issued deals with Christian Evidences, the Titles of the Holy Spirit, the Beatitudes, the Lord's Prayer, and Man and his Traits and Character. The American publishers deserve credit for producing the work in excellent style, and selling it at so moderate a price."

Our first impression in regard to this work was not very favorable, but after examining it we are prepared to give it the commendation quoted above. It is not a mere jumble of quotations without system or method. The first part of it is taken up with the Evidences of Christianity, and the selections are what the best writers have said on this subject. Another portion is occupied in setting forth in the same manner the Forces opposed to Christianity. Then there is a section, systematically arranged, on the Lord's Prayer. Taking up each petition it gives what has been said on it by the greatest divines and theologians. Another section is on the Beatitudes. Thus it may be seen that the reader gets access to the very best that has been said on these great subjects by the greatest and best of men. Although one of a series, yet it is entirely complete in itself. It strikes us that the successive editions, or volumes, will be eagerly sought after. It is large quarto size and contains over 500 pages.

PULPIT AND GRAVE. A volume of Funeral Addresses, etc. Edited by E. J. Wheeler, A. M. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, Publishers. Price, \$1.50.

The object sought by this work is to aid pastors in the performance of funeral services, which, confessedly, are among the most onerous and difficult which pertain to the sacred office. The material has been gathered from a very wide field, at home and abroad—very much of it being prepared expressly for this work—consisting of sermons, outlines, obituary addresses, prayers, classified texts, Scripture readings, death-bed testimonies, funeral etiquette, etc. The editor has spared no pains on the work, and has shown rare taste and judgment in the selection and arrangement of his rich and varied matter. We are confident its merits have but to be known to secure

for it a wide mission of usefulness. It will be found, we do not doubt, superior to any other work of a similar kind, and the list of over 400 texts, classified according to subjects, is a unique feature which will be found interesting and valuable.

Young pastors especially are often sorely tried in attending funerals and preaching funeral sermons. At first their feelings are so wrought upon that they are hardly fit to do anything as it should be done. Then they are often called to preach a funeral sermon without time to prepare it. Again, they are sorely tried to find suitable texts, especially if they yield to the expectation that prevails in many places that the text ought to be adapted to the deceased and almost every circumstance connected with his death.

This book will be a great help for this part of the pastor's work. It gives specimens of great funeral sermons. These are nice enough reading. But the part that will be valued most by young pastors is that which gives short sketches of funeral addresses, funeral texts, and rules of general etiquette. This last is something on which not only the pastor needs instruction, but the people also should be prepared. It might be well for a pastor every once in a while to preach a sermon just to teach the people what is proper to be done on an occasion of death and in regard to a funeral.

BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS. A Treatise on the Interpretation of the Old and New Testaments. By Milton S. Terry, S.T.D. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. 1883.

This work forms the second volume of the "Library of Biblical and Theological Literature," edited by George R. Crooks, D.D., and John F. Hurst, D.D., and designed to furnish ministers and laymen with a series of works which, in connection with the Commentaries now issuing, will make a compendious apparatus for study. It is a solidly printed octavo of 781 pages, and consists of three parts. Part first is an Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics. In it hermeneutics is defined, and its rank and importance considered. The Bible and other sacred books, the languages of the Bible, textual criticism, the divine inspiration of the Bible, and the qualifications of an interpreter are also, in this portion of the work, considered in a very lucid and instructive manner. Part second, which consists of thirty-four chapters, and forms the larger division of the work, treats of the principles of Biblical hermeneutics. We have in it those governing laws and methods of procedure by which the interpreter should determine the meaning of the Holy Scriptures set forth at length, and at the same time very fully illustrated by their application in the exposition of various portions of Scripture. While Dr. Terry fairly and distinctly explains the different methods of interpretation, he himself adopts and insists on the Grammatico-Historical method as that which most fully commends itself to the judgment and conscience of Christian scholars. The principles of interpretation which he maintains exclude entirely the doctrine of a double sense in Scripture. "We may readily admit," he says, "that the Scriptures are capable of manifold practical applications; otherwise they would not be so useful for doctrine, correction, and instruction in righteousness (2 Tim. 3: 16). But the moment we admit the principle that portions of Scripture contain an occult or double sense, we introduce an element of uncertainty in the sacred volume, and unsettle all scientific interpretation." Among the chapters in this part of the work which are especially interesting, are those treating of Symbolical Numbers, Names and Colors, the Gospel Apocalypse, the Pauline Eschatology, the Apocalypse of John, Scripture Quotations in the Scriptures, Alleged

Discrepancies of the Scriptures, Alleged Contradictions of Science, and Progress of Doctrine and Analogy of Faith. Part third gives the history of Biblical interpretation from the ancient Jewish and later Rabbinic exegesis through the earliest Christian and later Patristic exegesis and the exegesis of the middle ages and of the Reformation, down to that of our own times. To all is added a copious and excellent Bibliography of Hermeneutics, an index of Scripture texts, and a general index. Though we do not agree with Dr. Terry on all points, yet we can heartily recommend his treatise on hermeneutics as an excellent work, worthy a place in every minister's library. A thorough acquaintance with the contents of this volume can scarcely fail to be of advantage to every one called on to interpret the meaning of the Word of God.

THE THEORY OF MORALS. By Paul Janet, Member of the Institute, Author of "Final Causes," etc. Translated from the latest French Edition. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883.

This work was originally published in France in 1873. It has, however only recently been translated for the first time into English, from the latest French edition, by Miss Mary Chapman, under the supervision of President Noah Porter of Yale College. Prof. Janet in this volume, as he informs us in the preface, has endeavored to go back to first principles, and to define, with some precision, the fundamental ideas of morals in such a way as to present a systematic and well-connected exposition of them.

The treatise is divided into three books, which treat respectively of The End or Good; The Law or Duty; and Morality, or the Moral Agent. The method adopted in the work is, therefore, substantially that introduced into ethics by Schleiermacher, and followed by Martensen in his "Christian Ethics," with this difference, that Prof. Janet treats of Law or Duty before he does of Morality, or the Moral Agent, while the others named treat of Virtue before they do of Law.

In the first book of the "Theory of Morals" we have seven chapters which treat of the following subjects in the order here given: Pleasure and Good; Good and Law; The Principle of Excellency or Perfection; The Principle of Happiness; Impersonal Goods; The True, the Good, the Beautiful; and Absolute Good. The second book in six chapters discusses the Nature and Basis of the Moral Law, Good and Duty, Definite and Indefinite Duties, Right and Duty, Division of Duties, and Conflict of Duties. In the third book, which is divided into twelve chapters, the following subjects are considered: The Moral Consciousness, Moral Intention; Moral Probabilism; Universality of Moral Principles; The Moral Sentiment; Liberty; Kant's Theory of Liberty; Virtue; Moral Progress; Sin; Merit and Demerit—the Sanctions of the Moral Law; and Religion.

The fundamental principle of his work, the author informs us, "is, that *moral good* presupposes a *natural good* which is anterior to it, and serves as its foundation." His theory, he also informs us, "might be called a sort of *rational eudæmonism*, opposed on the one hand to utilitarian eudæmonism, and on the other to the too abstract formalism of Kant's morality, yet at the same time reconciling the two."

In every respect we consider the work a truly admirable one. The style in which it is written is unusually clear and attractive, and all the various subjects discussed are treated with marked thoroughness anotherer. Those who take any interest in ethics will find this treatise well worthy of careful study.

BIBLICAL LIGHTS AND SIDE LIGHTS. Ten Thousand Illustrations, with Thirty Thousand Cross-References; consisting of Facts, Incidents, and Remarkable Declarations taken from the Bible. For the use of Public Speakers and Teachers; and also for those in every profession who, for illustrative purposes, desire ready access to the Numerous Incidents and Striking Statements contained in the Bible. By Rev. Chas. E. Little. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, Publishers, 10 and 12 Dey Street, 1883.

The nature and purpose of this work are well set forth in the title-page, and we cannot give it higher praise than by saying that it is all it claims to be. It is not an analysis of the Bible or a concordance, but really what it professes to be, a cyclopedia of Biblical illustrations, and on this account has peculiar merits of its own. We know indeed of no other work like it, or that can properly supply its place. Ministers and Sunday-school teachers will especially find it a valuable assistant. By means of it they will be able readily to illustrate most subjects which may claim their attention by striking facts, interesting incidents and remarkable statements contained in the sacred Scriptures, and thus to illustrate them in the most effectual manner. The volume is a large octavo of 632 pages, and is admirably arranged in every respect to facilitate its use and to save labor.

JOHN FOSTER. Life and Thoughts; with Copious Index. By W. W. Everts, D.D. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, Publishers, 1883.

This is an excellent and instructive volume, and the thanks of the public are due to Messrs. Funk and Wagnalls for its publication in such cheap and attractive form. In the introduction Dr. Everts describes in an interesting manner the life and character of John Foster. Though this part of the work is brief, it nevertheless gives the salient points of Foster's life, and a very fair estimate of his intellectual, literary, and religious character. The body of the work is made up of thoughts of Foster's, gathered from his various works. These thoughts are his best, and constitute the most extraordinary passages of his writings. They treat of a great variety of subjects, and are arranged alphabetically under their appropriate topics, so as to be easily available for illustrative purposes. Those, therefore, who possess the complete works of Foster will nevertheless find this volume of service, while those who are without them will by means of it be able to form the acquaintance of one of the most profound and powerful thinkers and writers of the present century, and to possess themselves of some of the richest gems of thought.

A PRESENTATION OF THE GRAMMAR OF NEW ENGLISH; Beginning with the Age of Elizabeth. By George H. Webster. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Herald Printing Company, 1884.

Of the making of English grammars it would seem there is no end. Their name already is Legion, and yet one rapidly follows another. "The peculiarity of this book," the author tells us in the preface, "is its complete departure from the tradition of the elders." In this case, however, the departure is no improvement. As a specimen of the work we give the following sentences taken from the first page of the introduction. "Grammar is the science of the signification of the sentence." "In order to the signification of the sentence, grammar must and does regard each word as a *significant*." "A significant must, by virtue of both its signification and its significance, have some *function* in the sentence." While we cannot recommend the work as instructive, we have no hesitancy in pronouncing it entertaining.